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Abstract:  
This study offers a historical review of the monetary policy reform of October 6, 1979, and 
discusses the influences behind it and its significance. We lay out the record from the start of 
1979 through the spring of 1980, relying almost exclusively upon contemporaneous sources, 
including the recently released transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
meetings during 1979. We then present and discuss in detail the reasons for the FOMC’s 
adoption of the reform and the communications challenge presented to the Committee during 
this period. Further, we examine whether the essential characteristics of the reform were 
consistent with monetarism, new, neo, or old-fashioned Keynesianism, nominal income 
targeting, and inflation targeting. The record suggests that the reform was adopted when the 
FOMC became convinced that its earlier gradualist strategy using finely tuned interest rate 
moves had proved inadequate for fighting inflation and reversing inflation expectations. The 
new plan had to break dramatically with established practice, allow for the possibility of 
substantial increases in short-term interest rates, yet be politically acceptable, and convince 
financial markets participants that it would be effective. The new operating procedures were 
also adopted for the pragmatic reason that they would likely succeed. 
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Do we have the wit and the wisdom to restore an environment of price stability without 
impairing economic stability? Should we fail, I fear the distortions and uncertainty 
generated by inflation itself will greatly extend and exaggerate the sense of malaise and 
caution...Should we succeed, I believe the stage will have been set for a new long period 
of prosperity.
1 
—Paul Volcker 
  
 
A quarter-century after Paul Volcker’s monetary policy reform in October 1979, 
the profound significance of restoring price stability for the nation’s prosperity is widely 
recognized. Taming the inflation problem of the 1970s did set the stage for a long period 
of prosperity, as Volcker and many others had hoped. Over the past two decades, the 
nation has enjoyed greater price stability together with greater economic stability. 
Expansions have been uncommonly long and recessions relatively brief and shallow 
(Figure 1).  
The centerpiece of the reform was the abandonment of federal funds targeting in 
favor of nonborrowed reserves targeting as the operating procedure for controlling the 
nation’s money supply. This resulted in the unwelcome higher volatility of the federal 
funds rate (Figure 1) during a few years following the reform. In the prevailing 
environment of high and increasingly unstable inflation, however, small adjustments in 
the federal funds rate had proven woefully inadequate for reining in monetary growth.  
The reforms of October run much deeper than the technical details that a mere 
switch in operating procedures would suggest.
 2 By the end of the 1970s, the policy 
framework of the Federal Reserve had inadvertently contributed to macroeconomic 
                                                           
1 Volcker (1978, p. 61).   3
instability. The break in operating procedures facilitated a salutary reorientation of policy 
strategy, one focusing on the critical role of price stability for achieving and maintaining 
the System’s objectives. This study offers a historical review of the monetary policy 
reform of October 6, 1979, and examines the reasons for and lessons from that experience 
in this broader context of the Federal Reserve’s policy strategy.   
The paper is organized in five sections. The first section, How It Happened, lays 
out the historical record from the start of 1979 through the spring of 1980, relying almost 
exclusively upon contemporaneous sources and with deliberately minimal editorial 
comment. An important new source for this historical description is the transcripts of 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings during 1979. These transcripts, 
which only recently became publicly available, prove especially valuable for assessing 
the reasoning behind FOMC actions. The second section, Why?, presents and discusses 
12 reasons for the FOMC’s adoption of the reform, approximately in order of increasing 
subtlety. The third section looks at the communications challenge presented to the 
Committee during this period, and asks whether “What We Have Here Is a Failure to 
Communicate!” Or Not!  The fourth section asks Was Chairman Volcker…A Monetarist? 
A Nominal Income Targeter? A New, Neo, or Old-Fashioned Keynesian? An Inflation 
Targeter? or A Great Communicator? The final section concludes. 
 
HOW IT HAPPENED 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 For a description of the operating procedures prior to the reforms, see Wallich and Keir (1979). See 
Axilrod (1981) and Lindsey (1986) for descriptions of the new operating procedures.   4
  In the first half of 1979, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
under Chairman G. William Miller was short-handed and inexperienced, while the 
FOMC was deeply divided over the economic outlook, its primary policy objective, and 
its appropriate tactics. At the beginning of the year there were two vacancies on the 
Board, as Governor Jackson had resigned on November 17, 1978, and two days later 
Vice Chairman Gardner died. The two vacancies remained until one was filled by the 
appointment of Governor Rice on June 20, 1979. 
Of the five members of the Board on January 31, 1979, Governor Wallich, who 
had taken office in March 1974, had the longest tenure. Two governors, Chairman Miller 
and Governor Teeters, each had less than a year of service. The average tenure on that 
date was about 2.7 years, which was among the shortest on record (see Figure 2).
3  
At the year’s first FOMC meeting in February, the Board staff indicated in the 
Greenbook that they expected real growth to slow, unemployment to rise, and, as a 
consequence of the increasing labor-market slack, the inflation rate to decline (BOG, 
1979b, p. I-5). (Figure 3 shows the Greenbook forecasts through September and the 
staff’s forecast prepared right after the October 6 reform.) Through May, the staff 
forecast for real growth and unemployment stayed essentially unchanged, but the 
inflation outlook deteriorated appreciably.
4  
Board members and Reserve Bank presidents initially were about evenly split on 
the outlook for continued real growth versus recession, but on balance they became 
                                                           
3 Governor Partee served on the senior staff of the Board of Governors for many years before his 
appointment to the Board, which began January 5, 1976. The terms of members of the Board expire on 
January 31 of even-numbered years. 
4 See Kichline (1979a,b,c).   5
increasingly pessimistic as time passed. At the February 1979 meeting at least six 
individuals indicated that they felt a recession during that year was possible. At the same 
meeting at least nine other individuals indicated that they agreed with the staff forecast of 
no recession, or thought that the outlook was for strong growth, or thought the most 
pressing issue was the inflation rate (FOMC Transcript, 2/6/79, pp. 10, 12, 22-23). But by 
the March
 meeting, the sentiment among the governors and presidents for continuing 
growth was already souring; by then at least nine individuals predicted a recession before 
the end of the year. By the May meeting, at least eight individuals felt that the economy 
either already was in recession or close to a cyclical peak.  
In early July, the Greenbook assessed that a recession had already started by the 
second quarter, and it was projected to persist to the end of the year. The Board 
apparently held a similar view, as the July 17 Monetary Policy Report indicated that the 
projection of Board members for real gross national product (GNP) growth over 1979 
was –2 to –½  percent (BOG, 1979a, p. 76). All the while, inflation was worsening 
further, in part due to the rapid increase in energy prices. Private forecasts of economic 
activity were no less pessimistic. Indeed, the Blue Chip consensus forecast pointed to a 
recession even before the staff did, starting in May. Such forecasts of recession 
accompanied by increasingly virulent inflation remained a recurrent theme both in the 
Greenbook and in the Blue Chip consensus forecasts for the remainder of the year.  
  The deteriorating inflation situation and the increasing pessimism about 
prospective real growth produced different opinions at the FOMC table as to the 
appropriate focus of policy. One group was quite vocal that priority had to be assigned to   6
addressing inflation; a second group was equally vociferous that priority instead should 
be given to mitigating the risk of economic weakness. The conflict posed a difficult 
situation for Chairman Miller, who appears to have viewed his role as that of discovering 
a consensus among the FOMC principals. His mode of operation was to collect 
statements on the wording of a directive (in terms of growth rates of M1 and M2 and a 
range for the federal funds rate) and then to float a “trial balloon” to see how much 
support it garnered (FOMC Transcript, 3/20/1979, pp. 31-32). At some meetings 
Chairman Miller did not even state his own view of the economic outlook or an 
appropriate wording for the directive. 
  Dissents from the directive were common, even numerous at some of the 
meetings in the first half of 1979. Four members dissented at the March meeting because 
they favored tighter policy—after only one dissent, also in that direction, at the February 
meeting (BOG, 1979a, pp. 142-43). Three dissents from the directive occurred in April, 
all toward tighter policy, and three dissents again were recorded in May—two for easier 
and one for tighter policy (BOG, 1979a, pp. 156, 165). The conference calls on June 15 
and July 27 elicited one dissent each, the first in favor of a tighter policy stance and the 
second in favor of an easier one (BOG, 1979a, pp. 166, 178). Only at the July meeting 
was the directive adopted unanimously (BOG, 1979a, p. 178). Based on his comments, 
Chairman Miller seemed frustrated by the dissents.  
  An ongoing issue during the first half of 1979 was whether the FOMC should 
frame the operating paragraph of the directive to the Manager for Domestic Operations, 
System Open Market Account, in terms of a “monetary aggregates” or a “money   7
markets” objective.  This nuance was a significant issue in the minds of many FOMC 
participants.  Surprisingly, considering the extent of the internal discussion devoted to 
this issue, the only explicit definition or explanation of the terminology that we have been 
able to find is in the staff recommendations for alternative wording of the directive that 
appear in the 1979 Bluebooks.  For example, in the Bluebook for the February 1979 
FOMC meeting the staff suggested both a “monetary aggregates emphasis” and a “money 
market emphasis” as alternative wording for the directive.  The difference seems to be 
only a single phrase.  The suggested wording with the monetary aggregates emphasis was 
this: 
 “If, with approximately equal weight given to M1 and M2, their growth 
rates appear to be significantly above or below the midpoints of the 
indicated ranges, the objective for the funds rate is to be raised or lowered 
in an orderly fashion within its range.” (BOG, 1979c, p. 20)
  
 
The suggested wording for the money market emphasis was this: 
“If, with approximately equal weight given to M1 and M2, their growth 
rates appear to be close to or beyond the upper or lower limits of the 
indicated ranges, the objective for the funds rate is to be raised or lowered 
in an orderly fashion within its range.” (BOG, 1979c, p. 20)  
 
The distinction seemed to have hinged on whether the Manager was to react to growth of 
the aggregates within the specified ranges or only when the growth of the aggregates 
approached or went outside of the stated ranges.  But in practice, the federal funds rate 
fluctuated within rather narrow ranges under either directive.  On the basis of this 
distinction, all of the directives from the February through September 1979 FOMC 
meetings, except for that adopted at the March FOMC meeting, were “money market 
directives.”   8
  As to the actual policy stance, Chairman Miller’s tenure in 1979 included only 
minor tightenings—gauged by the FOMC’s funds rate objective. Two occurred on 
conference calls and without formal FOMC votes. They were in line with directive 
instructions to make small funds rate adjustments up (or down) within a specified range 
to resist emerging faster- (or slower-) than-specified growth in the monetary aggregates. 
The first took place on April 27, when the funds rate objective went from a range of 10 to 
10 ⅛ percent to 10 ¼  percent, and the second on July 19, when the FOMC raised the 
target to 10 ½  percent. On the next day, the Board unanimously voted to hike the 
discount rate ½ percentage point to 10 percent. Miller’s departure to the Treasury was 
announced on July 19 and took place when Chairman Volcker was sworn in on August 6. 
When Miller went to the Treasury, the Trading Desk, acting between Committee 
meetings in accord with directive instructions from the FOMC, was pursuing an 
increased federal funds rate objective of 10 
5⁄8 percent or a shade higher, compared with 
10 percent or slightly higher as the year began. 
   Vice Chairman Volcker’s impression of emerging macroeconomic problems 
remained remarkably constant during G. William Miller’s chairmanship in 1979. Such a 
conclusion can be drawn from Volcker’s comments at the February, March, April, and 
May meetings of the FOMC:  
Vice Chairman Volcker…I continue to feel that we could have a 
recession, but it’s by no means certain. I wouldn’t rule one out, by any 
means, in the second half of the year.  But in terms of the recession 
outlook itself, I think the number one problem continues to be the concern 
about the price level. The greatest risk to the economy, as well as [to 
actual] inflation, is people having the feeling that prices are getting out of 
control. (FOMC Transcript, 2/6/1979, p. 10) 
   9
Vice Chairman Volcker…I think the odds are better than 50/50 that we’re 
going to run into a recession by [year-end], and I’ve thought that for some 
time...Essentially, I think we’re in retreat on the inflation side; if there’s 
not a complete rout, it’s close to it. And in my view that poses the major 
danger to the stability of the economy as we proceed. (FOMC Transcript, 
3/20/1979, pp. 9-10) 
 
Vice Chairman Volcker...And [inflation] clearly remains our problem. In 
any longer-range or indeed shorter-range perspective, the inflationary 
momentum has been increasing. In terms of economic stability in the 
future that is what is likely to give us the most problems and create the 
biggest recession. And the difficulty in getting out of a recession, if we 
succeed, is that it conveys an impression that we are not dealing with 
inflation. I’m afraid that is the impression that we are conveying. We talk 
about gradually decelerating the rate of inflation over a series of years. In 
fact, it has been accelerating over a series of years and hasn’t yet shown 
any signs of reversing. (FOMC Transcript, 4/17/1979, p. 16) 
                       
Vice Chairman Volcker...I’m impressed by the degree that inflation is now 
built into thinking in terms of the business outlook.  I’m also impressed—
the supporting factor—by the degree with which capacity problems and 
backlogs exist...Frank Morris said that we can’t casually assume the 
recession will be mild. I suppose we can’t casually assume it, although it 
looks that way to me now—if we’re going to have one. But we can’t 
always be looking at the worst. If we’re going to balance these risks of 
inflation and recession we have to run not too scared that the recession is 
going to be worse than we expect. So it is a question of bringing about a 
balance. (FOMC Transcript, 5/22/1979, p. 22) 
 
  While vice chairman, Volcker expressed skepticism about the ability of 
economists to make accurate forecasts: 
Vice Chairman Volcker...When I look at the outlook for real GNP, it does 
seem to me that the staff forecast of six quarters of approximately 1 
percent growth in GNP per quarter is inherently improbable. I don’t think 
that has ever happened. 
 
Chairman Miller. Plus or minus 3 percent. 
 
Vice Chairman Volcker. That is precisely the difficulty. The reason they 
have come up with this forecast is that one doesn’t know whether the 3 
percent error will in fact be plus or minus. I must say in talking about 
projection errors that I am much more concerned about the persistent   10
errors in the projections of the inflation rate than I am about the recent 
errors in the projections of the monetary aggregates. The inflation 
projections have been consistently on the low side. And I’m not just 
talking about the staff’s projections; I think that has been true of most 
forecasters. (FOMC Transcript, 4/17/1979, pp. 15-16) 
 
Vice Chairman Volcker...I’m not inclined to raise the question of whether 
the staff have overestimated the rate of price increase; I doubt that that’s 
the case. (FOMC Transcript, 7/11/1979, p. 7) 
 
  Given his view of the outlook for inflation, despite more hopeful forecasts by 
others, Volcker advocated monetary policy tightening in the first part of the year before 
the policy move in that direction in late April. In February he first voted in a straw poll 
against standing pat before grudgingly switching his vote in the end. However, he 
dissented from that policy stance at both the March and April meetings. 
Vice Chairman Volcker...I think we are at a critical point in the inflation 
program, with the tide against us. If we don’t show any response at all, we 
are giving an unfortunate signal in my judgment. I believe those concerned 
about inflation would find no response during this period almost 
inexplicable in terms of what we say regarding our worries about 
inflation...I do think we need to make some move in recognition of what 
has been happening on the inflation front. And I think its good for the 
stability of the economy in the long run. (FOMC Transcript, 3/20/79, pp. 
10, 28) 
 
Vice Chairman Volcker...We may be one month closer to a recession than 
we were last month and I think we are late [in tightening], but I still am of 
the view that some greater degree of restriction would be more appropriate 
than the reverse [and] more appropriate than standing still. (FOMC 
Transcript, 4/17/1979, p. 16) 
 
  His hawkish perspective at the March and April meetings did not, however, 
mainly stem from recent rapid money growth—which at that time in fact was running far 
below expectations.
5 
                                                           
5 Light editing that actually appears in the official transcripts is shown here within brackets, [ ]. Further 
editing we have done for this paper is shown with braces, { }.   11
Vice Chairman Volcker...I don’t think that {a money} target itself, though 
written in our records, is written in heaven, given all the uncertainties that 
we had when we set it...{T}he exact level of the aggregates isn’t quite as 
important to me as the movement on the funds rate. I’d like to make some 
gesture there immediately. (FOMC Transcript, 3/20/1979, pp. 28-29) 
 
Vice Chairman Volcker...I sit here listening to all this about the aggregates 
and it seems to me that the only reasonable conclusion is not to put much 
weight on the aggregates. We see relationships that go way out of the 
range of historical experience. We haven’t any idea of the validity of the 
forecast [for the monetary aggregates], I’m afraid, and the combination of 
those two events does not make me want to linger over the aggregates. 
(FOMC Transcript, 4/17/1979, p. 15) 
 
  By the time of the May meeting, though, money growth had become more 
normal, and he was ready to upgrade the role of the aggregates in policymaking. 
Vice Chairman Volcker...As I thought about what to do, I arrived at the 
same conclusion that Steve did up to a point—that maybe for lack of 
anything better we should go back and look at the aggregates a bit...I was 
thinking of widening the range mostly in the downward direction rather 
than widening it on the up side. But I do think that’s a reasonable 
approach as we watch both the aggregates and the business news in the 
next six weeks. (FOMC Transcript, 5/11/1979, p. 22) 
 
  Volcker’s hawkish views were well known outside the Federal Reserve as well as 
inside at the time President Carter interviewed him for Federal Reserve Chairman in July. 
In Volcker’s recollection of the interview, “I told him the Federal Reserve was going to 
have to be tighter and that it was very important that its independence be maintained.” 
Although Volcker thought that these views might preclude his nomination as Chairman, 
the President proved him wrong despite the opposition of some of his advisers (Treaster, 
2004, pp. 61-62). President Carter’s nomination of Paul Volcker to replace G. William 
Miller as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board was announced on July 25. The 
exchange value of the dollar steadied on this news, but in a July 27 conference call that   12
was not transcribed, the FOMC voted to raise not the actual funds rate target but rather 
the upper limit of its allowable range to 10 ¾  percent, making a new range of 10 ½  to 10 
¾ percent, owing to strong growth in the aggregates (FOMC, 1979b, pp. 1-2.).  
Volcker’s nomination enjoyed wide support across the political spectrum, and his 
confirmation hearing on July 30 was relatively uneventful. At the hearing Volcker 
reiterated his well-publicized views in favor of curbing inflation and stressed that “if 
we’re going to have price stability” it was “indispensable” to bring down the growth of 
monetary aggregates (U.S. Senate, 1979, p. 12). Volcker took the oath of office on 
August 6, and he presided over the August 14 FOMC meeting. At that meeting, the 
FOMC continued its recent turn toward firming. With two dissents—one in favor of a 
smaller, and one in favor of a larger, move—the FOMC raised the funds rate objective 
from 10 
5⁄8  percent or a shade higher to 11 percent. Chairman Volcker’s thinking can be 
gleaned from a selection of his comments. 
Chairman Volcker...It looks as though we’re in a recession; I suppose we 
have to consider that the recession could be worse than the staff’s 
projections suggest at this time...When we look at the other side, I don’t 
have to talk much about the inflation numbers...And when I look ahead, 
nobody is very optimistic about the inflation picture...When I look at the 
past year or two I am impressed myself by an intangible: the degree to 
which inflationary psychology has really changed...{I}t would be very 
nice if in some sense we could restore our own credentials and [the 
credibility] of economic policy in general on the inflation issue. (FOMC 
Transcript, 9/14/79, pp. 20-22)   
 
  He proposed “some gesture” at that meeting, though the time did not seem ripe 
for a major move or any procedural change. 
Chairman Volcker...{W}e don’t have a lot of room for maneuver and I 
don’t think we want to use up all our ammunition right now in a really 
dramatic action; I don’t see that the exchange market or anything else   13
really requires that at the moment. Certainly dramatic action would not be 
understood without more of a crisis atmosphere than there is at the 
moment. Ordinarily I tend to think we ought to keep our ammunition 
reserved as much as possible for more of a crisis situation where we have 
a rather clear public backing for whatever drastic action we take. (FOMC 
Transcript, 9/14/1979, pp. 22-23) 
 
   On August 16, the Board voted unanimously to increase the discount rate ½ 
percentage point to 10 ½ percent. In response to continued strong aggregates growth and 
dollar weakness, the Desk subsequently raised the funds rate objective in two steps (in 
accordance with directive instructions) to 11 
3⁄8  percent by the end of August, an 
operating objective that lasted until the September 18 FOMC meeting. The Board 
considered additional requests to raise the discount rate in late August and early 
September but appeared deeply divided on the need for such increases. In late August, the 
Board voted against such raises. Then, in early September it tabled multiple requests for 
additional action, effectively postponing a decision until after the FOMC meeting 
scheduled for September 18 (BOG Minutes, 9/7/1979, p. 4; 9/14/79, p. 3). 
  Early in the September 18 meeting, President Roos of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis raised the question of whether the FOMC’s operating procedures should be 
reexamined. Chairman Volcker indicated that the Committee’s decision that day should 
be within the traditional approach, but that the question should be reassessed soon by the 
Committee.  
Mr. Roos...[Given] your statements, which I think are great, that we’re 
never going to accomplish our ultimate goal until we achieve some 
discipline in terms of monetary growth, couldn’t we discuss these issues 
again? Maybe I am out of order to raise this now, but couldn’t there be a 
discussion again of whether or not our traditional policy of targeting on 
interest rates, in spite of the possible adverse consequences in terms of 
money growth, [is appropriate]? Shouldn’t this be given another look in   14
view of everything you’ve said and in view of the less than happy 
experience that the FOMC has had over the past years in achieving its 
goals of stability in terms of the inflation problem? Shouldn‘t we take a 
look at this in some way? 
 
Chairman Volcker. My feeling would be that you’re not out of order in 
raising that question, Mr. Roos. We would be out of order in having an 
extended discussion of it today, because I don’t think we’re going to 
resolve it. I presume that today, for better or worse, we have to couch our 
policy in what has become the traditional framework. But I think it is a 
very relevant question, which has come up from time to time, and I think 
we should be exploring it again in the relatively near future. And I would 
plan to do so. (FOMC Transcript, 9/18/1979, pp. 13-14) 
                                                                  
  Later at that FOMC meeting, Chairman Volcker, in laying out the policy choice, 
again noted both horns of the existing dilemma. 
Chairman Volcker...There is a very strong possibility of recession on the 
one side. We’ve had that possibility for almost six months now and we 
still have the unemployment rate at a level that some consider to be the 
natural rate. I don’t know whether it is or it isn’t, but we had a lot of 
discussion earlier, which may be reflected in some of the comments about 
labor markets still being fairly tight. And, obviously, we have inflation as 
strong as ever. We have a difficult timing problem. Difficult or not we 
have a timing problem if the business outlook develops more or less as 
projected, in that we don’t have a lot of flexibility—at least flexibility in a 
tightening direction—in terms of what we can do in the midst of a real 
downturn...But we are in a rather crucial period in terms of how much the 
probably deteriorating inflationary expectations now get built into the 
wage structure...I also share the view that has been quite widely expressed 
that we have to show some resistance to the growth in money. (FOMC 
Transcript, 9/18/1979, pp. 33-34) 
  
 He recommended only limited further tightening: 
 
Chairman Volcker...As I listened, among the voting members of the 
Committee at least, I think there was a majority desire—but clearly not 
unanimous—to make a little move on the federal funds rate. So I would 
propose 11-1/2 percent on that at this point. I am not particularly eager to 
make a major move now or in the foreseeable future, so I would suggest 
that we put a band around that of 11-1/4 to 11-3/4 percent, which ought to 
[result in a] reconsideration before a very major step on the funds rate. 
(FOMC Transcript, 9/18/1979, p. 35)   15
 
  The vote elicited eight assents but four dissents; the dissents included Governor 
Rice on the dovish side, but three of them came from hawks—Presidents Balles and 
Black and Governor Coldwell—who were disappointed at the lack of sufficiently forceful 
action. After the conclusion of the FOMC meeting, the Board met to consider the pending 
requests for raising the discount rate. The Board continued to be divided on the 
desirability of such action. Members supporting the increase pointed to the virulence of 
inflation and inflationary expectations, while members opposing the action emphasized 
the weakening in economic activity and the lagged effects of monetary policy. In the end 
the Board split nearly evenly in approving a ½-percentage-point discount rate hike to 11 
percent: The vote was four to three, with the dissenting votes all on the dovish side: 
Governors Partee, Rice, and Teeters. 
  As usual, the vote on the discount rate, with the three dissents toward more dovish 
policy, became known right away, following the announcement of the discount rate 
change. By contrast, neither the FOMC’s tightening action that morning nor the hawkish 
sentiment reflected in the three dissents in favor of further tightening was released 
immediately. Without this information, the dovish dissents on the discount rate had a 
dramatic and arguably misleading effect on perceptions regarding the policy intentions of 
the FOMC. The Board action engendered the perception that the Federal Reserve’s 
resistance to inflationary forces would be insufficient and discomfited financial markets. 
The press interpreted the vote thusly: 
Many money market analysts have been expecting the FOMC to seek to 
tighten credit again in an effort to slow down sharp increases in the money 
supply...However, the split vote, with its clear signal that from the Fed’s   16
own point of view interest rates are at or close to their peak for this 
business cycle, might forestall any more increases in market interest rates.
 
(Berry, 1979, A1) 
 
This division indicates that Mr. Volcker’s drive for a restrictive monetary 
policy may encounter increasing opposition within the seven-member 
board. (The Wall Street Journal [WSJ], 1979b, p. 2)  
 
[T]he vote left uncertain whether Paul A. Volcker, who became Federal 
Reserve chairman early in August, could continue to command a majority 
for his high-rate policies. The split was seen as indicating a fundamental 
division within the board over whether inflation remains a more pressing 
problem than recession... 
  “A 4-3 split is significant because it means Volcker will have to sit 
harder on the liberal governors,” Jeffrey A. Nichols, vice president and 
chief economist of the Argus Research Corporation, said. “The Chairman 
will have to be tough to keep the other members under control.”... 
  One banker said she thought the failure of the board yesterday to 
cite inflation or the growth of the money supply, but merely to note 
technical factors, could indicate a compromise with governors who were 
becoming more concerned about recession than inflation. “It might mean 
we have the beginnings of a dovish voting group,” she added. (Bennett, 
1979, p. A1) 
 
Some dealers reasoned that the Federal Reserve Board’s 4-to-3 split vote 
on the discount rate increase meant the central bank would have difficulty 
in making further moves to restrict the growth of money and credit... 
  “The Reserve Board vote,” one municipal bond dealer said, 
“makes me think that this is as much of a push toward higher rates as 
we’re going to get for a while. I [don’t] think that 4-to-3 vote sat very well 
with a lot of traders today.” (Allen, 1979, p. D9) 
 
The 4-to-3 split gave rise to speculation that the Federal Reserve was 
unlikely to drive interest rates still higher. (Cowan, 1979, p. 1) 
 
The relatively small increase in the funds target reflects “a growing split 
within the Fed’s policy-making circle,” according to David Jones, an 
economist for Aubrey G. Lanston & Co. He reasoned that with the 
economy losing steam some Fed officials want a pause in credit tightening 
while others contend that further moves are necessary to battle inflation. 
(WSJ, 1979e, p. 5) 
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The events of September 18 had a swift destabilizing effect on markets that set the 
tone for developments over the following three weeks. Commodity markets, in particular, 
became extremely volatile, alarming policymakers. Developments in commodity markets 
during this period are illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the daily futures prices of the 
December 1979 contracts for gold, silver, and copper, and the January 1980 contract for 
platinum. The vertical lines in each panel indicate the dates of FOMC meetings. The solid 
line designates the opening price each day, while the high-low lines denote the intraday 
range of price fluctuation. Gold and silver futures prices rose steadily between the August 
and September FOMC meeting dates, but with the exception of a few days, the intraday 
volatility was little changed from earlier in the summer. Copper futures were stable 
during this period, and, though platinum prices rose, they merely returned to mid-year 
levels. 
  The behavior of prices in these markets changed dramatically in the days after the 
discount-rate announcement. Gold and silver prices continued moving up, and intraday 
volatility increased substantially. Copper and platinum futures prices rose rapidly, also 
with substantial intraday volatility. Prices on all four futures contracts reached a peak on 
October 2 and retreated sharply for the next several days. 
  The price developments in these markets were noted regularly in the press. A 
sample of this commentary, which uniformly interpreted these developments as evidence 
of hedging against inflation, follows: 
For gold’s rise, analysts had been citing the metal’s traditional allure 
during times of inflation and general global unease. (WSJ, 1979a, p. 3) 
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With a leap that would have been dismissed before as inconceivable, the 
price of gold soared a record $24 an ounce in London, to another high of 
$375.75, and then jumped an additional $6.25 in later dealings in New 
York. 
  Although he [a Treasury official] said he didn’t believe gold’s 
surge was “directed particularly against the dollar,” he said the jump was 
“disturbing” and could cause a “widespread psychological reaction...a lack 
of confidence in our ability to turn inflation around.” (WSJ, 1979c, p. 8) 
 
Mr. Miller told the National Conference of State Legislatures that there 
has been a ‘speculative trend’ in the gold market as people bought gold as 
an inflationary hedge... 
  Another Treasury official called the current gold rush “a symptom 
of growing concern about world-wide inflation.” Lisle Widman, the 
Treasury’s deputy assistant secretary for international monetary affairs 
added that ‘the message we would draw is that governments around the 
globe need to redouble efforts to curb inflation.”(WSJ, 1979d, p. 2) 
 
In the commodity markets, nervous speculators sent futures prices through 
wild gyrations. At first, prices rose sharply as the recent bout of gold and 
silver fever spread to markets for other raw materials. Gold, silver, copper, 
platinum and sugar all rose to new highs in early dealings, presumably 
because inflation-wary speculators continued to dump dollars in favor of 
commodities... 
  But then came the rumors that the U.S. might be planning a major 
new dollar-support program. On the theory that fighting inflation to save 
the dollar might depress commodity prices, speculators began selling, and 
many futures prices skidded the maximum permitted in a single day of 
trading. By the end of the day, however, most prices recovered somewhat 
when the rumors hadn’t been substantiated, and many traders admitted to 
considerable confusion about the day’s developments. (WSJ, 1979f, p. 1) 
 
A few days after the discount-rate vote, Governor Partee spoke to the Money 
Marketeers in New York. Their harsh questions converted him on the spot from a dove to 
a hawk (Greider, 1987, p. 85).  
As September drew to a close, the crisis that Chairman Volcker spoke of at the 
August FOMC meeting evidently had arrived, and the need for a dramatic monetary 
policy announcement had become compelling. The Chairman became increasingly   19
convinced that such action should include a change in operating procedures 
deemphasizing the federal funds rate in favor of reserves as an operating instrument. He 
asked Stephen Axilrod, Economist for the FOMC, and Peter Sternlight, Manager for 
Domestic Operations, System Open Market Account, to prepare a background 
memorandum for the FOMC outlining the general features of such a proposed new 
approach. He also discussed changing the operating procedures with the other members 
of the Board to garner their support early on (Greider, 1987 pp. 105-118; Volcker and 
Gyohten, 1992, pp. 167; Treaster, 2004, p. 150; FOMC Transcript, 10/5/1979, p. 1).  
  In his discussions with the Board members, Fred Schultz, the Board’s vice 
chairman, lined up foursquare behind the Chairman, as would usually be the case in 
decisions to come, in this instance in his support for the Chairman’s call for dramatic 
monetary-policy action. The three Board members who had voted against the discount 
rate hike, Teeters, Rice, and Partee, also supported the change. As will be discussed in 
more detail below, they liked the automaticity of the reserves-based technique in that the 
FOMC did not choose, and thus could not be identified as having chosen, the specific 
level of the funds rate. The two hawks, Wallich and Coldwell, were philosophically 
opposed to money and reserve targeting as unreliable and as removing too much central 
bank judgment from the monetary policy process, but they were willing to go along with 
it if necessary to get FOMC support for a substantially tighter policy stance. According to 
Greider, 
Wallich did not argue much. “I was not sure people would do it my way,” 
he said. “It was probably wise to use a method that produced a consensus 
for tightening.” (Greider, 1987, p. 113) 
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 On September 29, Chairman Volcker left for the annual International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) meeting, which was in Belgrade that year.
6  On the plane flight to Europe, 
the Chairman took the opportunity to brief two top administration officials, G. William 
Miller, who was now Secretary of the Treasury, and Charles Schultze, chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors. They were not enthused with the idea of new procedures, 
and in coming days they made their solidifying views known to Volcker.  Moreover, in 
their subsequent conversations with President Jimmy Carter, the President may have 
voiced similar concerns to them. But Chairman Volcker considered it significant that the 
President never expressed this disapproval to him in person or otherwise (Volcker and 
Gyohten, 1992, pp. 168-69).  
On his trip abroad, Chairman Volcker also sought the counsel of various trusted 
foreign leaders and central bankers, including Germany’s Helmut Schmidt and Otmar 
Emminger. Their comments only reinforced his intention to move ahead. When his 
participation was no longer required at the IMF meetings, he returned early to the United 
States (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992, p. 168). 
Chairman Volcker arrived in Washington on Tuesday, October 2, with his ears 
still resonating with strongly stated European recommendations for stern action to stem 
severe dollar weakness on exchange markets. His unexpectedly early return fueled 
market rumors that action dealing with the crisis might be imminent. This had a 
                                                           
6 In addition to Chairman Volcker, the three previous Federal Reserve Chairmen were at the Belgrade 
meeting. Chairman Miller was attending as Treasury secretary. And Chairman Martin was to introduce 
Chairman Burns who was giving the Per Jacobsson lecture that year. Burns took the occasion to deliver his 
remarkable “The Anguish of Central Banking,” which we return to later on.    21
stabilizing effect on commodities markets, with futures markets opening lower on 
October 3, retracing some of their sharp increases on the previous several days (Figure 4).  
The next regularly scheduled meeting of the FOMC was to take place on October 
16, 1979, two weeks after Volcker’s return from Europe. However, and likely in light of 
the urgency of the situation after September 18, the Chairman instead decided to convene 
a special FOMC meeting earlier in the month. The special meeting, scheduled in secret 
and on very short notice, was to take place on Saturday, October 6, in Washington. 
Little new governmental data was released in the three weeks after September 18 
that could have provoked a sense of urgency about significant policy action. Table 1, 
reproduced from the Greenbook from October 12, 1979, shows the dating of various 
statistical releases tracked by the staff between September 18 and October 5. The only 
data published after that starting date but before Volcker left for Belgrade were for the 
consumer price index (CPI) and housing starts in August. To be sure, the annualized one-
month core CPI inflation rate in August exceeded 12 percent, up substantially from the 
8.7 percent July core CPI inflation rate available at the September FOMC meeting. But 
this information, while unpleasant, did not seem to be the source of the alarm, as shall be 
seen from Chairman Volcker’s interpretation of these figures on October 6. 
In the morning of Thursday, October 4, two days before the planned Saturday 
meeting, the Board met in its Special Library to discuss the possible monetary policy 
actions under consideration. According to the Minutes of the meeting:  
[O]ne member of the Board referred to the outburst of speculative activity 
in the gold market, which appeared to be spilling over into other 
commodity markets as well, and to the very sensitive conditions in 
domestic financial and dollar exchange markets. He also noted that   22
inflationary sentiment appeared to be intensifying as data on price 
increases continued to worsen. Against this background, the staff had been 
directed to prepare memoranda on a package of possible actions designed 
to show convincingly the Federal Reserve’s resolve to contain monetary 
and credit expansion in the U.S., to help curb emerging speculative 
excesses, and thereby to dampen inflationary forces and lend support to 
the dollar in foreign exchange markets. Such a package might include 
actions on reserve requirements and the discount rate; in addition, the staff 
had been asked to analyze the implications of a possible shift in Federal 
Open Market Committee procedures, whereby the Desk, in its day-to-day 
operations, would operate more directly on a bank reserves, rather than a 
Federal funds rate, target. (BOG Minutes, 10/4/1979, p. 1-2)  
 
The Minutes indicate that “Board members agreed on the seriousness of the situation and 
on the need for action,” but postponed taking decisions on reserve requirements and the 
discount rate until Saturday, when the special FOMC meeting was to be held (BOG 
Minutes, 10/4/1979, p. 2-4).  
 That same day, the background memorandum on the proposed new operating 
procedures that Stephen Axilrod and Peter Sternlight were preparing at Chairman 
Volcker’s request was finalized and sent electronically to the FOMC. The Axilrod and 
Sternlight memorandum envisioned that the FOMC would specify desired short-run 
growth rates for M1 and other monetary aggregates. The staff would then construct the 
associated paths for total reserves and the monetary base. The memorandum also 
suggested another point at which an FOMC decision would be a crucial aspect of the 
newly structured operations: 
A method for setting the level of nonborrowed reserves would be to take 
the average level of borrowing in recent weeks and subtract them from 
total reserves. Or the Committee could take a different level of 
borrowing—either higher or lower—depending in part on whether it 
wishes to tilt money market conditions toward tightness or ease in the 
period ahead. Whether money market interest rates would tend to rise, or 
rise more than they otherwise would, then depends on whether the demand   23
for the total monetary base or total reserves were strong relative to the 
FOMC’s path. If strong, the funds rate and the level of member banks 
borrowing would tend to rise as the Desk adhered to the initial path level 
{of} nonborrowed reserves. Conversely, if demands were weak, the funds 
rate, and the level of member bank borrowing, would tend to decline. 
(Axilrod and Sternlight, 1979, p. 7) 
  
The FOMC held a last-minute information-sharing conference call on October 5. 
 
Chairman Volcker...You will have very shortly, if you don’t already, a 
memorandum that Steve Axilrod and Peter Sternlight prepared describing 
a possible approach that involves leaning more heavily on the aggregates 
in the period immediately ahead. And the complement of that is leaning 
less heavily on the federal funds rate in terms of immediate policy 
objectives. We have had some considerable discussion of that over the 
past couple of weeks here and that memorandum attempts to distill some 
of the thinking. I want to discuss tomorrow whether to adopt that 
approach, not as a permanent [decision] at this stage, but as an approach 
for between now and the end of the year, roughly, in any event.  (FOMC 
Transcript, 10/5/1979, p. 1) 
 
He also referred to the unstable conditions in commodities markets: 
 
Chairman Volcker. The discussions abroad were very difficult in a number 
of respects. The feeling of confidence is not high, I should say, in a 
number of directions and that increases the difficulty of restoring a sense 
of stability. One of the alarming things earlier, to me at least, was the 
sensitivity and responsiveness of some of the commodity markets outside 
of gold and silver to what was going on. There were some very sharp 
increases in prices of copper and other metals at the end of last week and 
at the beginning of this week, a development that has since subsided 
somewhat with the improvement in the gold market and the exchange 
market. But, quite clearly, we are in a very sensitive period. (FOMC 
Transcript, 10/5/1979, p. 4) 
 
The momentous special meeting convened at 10:10 am on Saturday. Chairman Volcker 
framed the issues. 
Chairman Volcker...We wouldn’t be here today if we didn’t have a 
problem with the state of the markets, whether international or domestic. 
They were pretty feverish last week—or beginning in the previous week, 
really. Beginning about 2 weeks ago and carrying over into the early part 
of what is still this week, the foreign exchange market was in a situation   24
that was clearly not amenable for very long to such techniques as 
intervention. The markets have turned around some in the past few days, 
as you know. I think that is almost entirely explicable by the fact that at 
about the time I returned from Belgrade Treasury officials and others were 
making some statements that left hanging the possibility of some kind of a 
package, so the foreign exchange dealers have retreated to the sidelines... 
  In terms of the economy,...my own concerns about the risks of the 
economy falling off the table, though they have not evaporated, have 
diminished a bit...On the price front, expectations have certainly gotten 
worse rather than better...I certainly conclude from all this that we can’t 
walk away today without a program that is strong in fact and perceived as 
strong in terms of dealing with the situation...{W}e are not dealing with a 
stable psychological or stable expectational situation by any means. And 
on the inflation front we’re probably losing ground. In an expectational 
sense, I think we certainly are, and that is being reflected in extremely 
volatile financial markets...{Regarding} the commodities issue{, 
b}eginning a little more than a week ago, late in the previous week when 
the gold market was gyrating, there was some very clear evidence that this 
psychology was getting into the metals markets in particular in a very 
forceful way and maybe in the grains markets very temporarily...The 
psychology in the foreign markets is the same as the psychology at home; 
it is reflected in the metals markets. It is the inflationary psychology or 
whatever. (FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, pp. 4-6, 12, 15)  
 
  Chairman Volcker argued, however, that overall inflation data were not alarming 
as yet:  
 
Chairman Volcker...Even though the price news is bad, it does not in my 
judgment as yet reflect a spreading of the whole inflationary force into 
areas outside of energy. We had a fluctuation in food [prices] last month, 
but that [component of the price index] goes up and down. If we look at 
the wage trend, so far as we know—with the exception of the General 
Motors settlement—we haven’t had a real breakout yet. But we’re dealing 
with a situation where that’s an imminent danger on the one side as is the 
possibility of a recession on the other side. (FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, 
p. 5) 
      
  Chairman Volcker then laid out the specific options: 
 
Chairman Volcker...Now, when it comes to our action here, I think there 
are broadly two possibilities. One is taking measures of what might be 
thought of as the traditional type. That would include a discount rate move 
on the one side and so far as this Committee is concerned a significant 
increase in the federal funds rate—putting those moves together. The   25
Board will be considering some reserve requirement changes later today. 
Let’s assume that the package would include that... 
  The other possibility is a change in the emphasis of our operations 
as outlined in the memorandum that was distributed, which I hope you’ve 
all had a chance to read. That involves managing Desk operations from 
week to week essentially, with a greater effort to bring about a reserve 
path that will in turn achieve a money supply target—which we have to 
discuss—recognizing that that would require a wider range for the federal 
funds rate and would involve a more active management of the discount 
rate. And of course the question of reserve requirements and the discount 
rate change at this point are relevant in that context too.  (FOMC 
Transcript, 10/6/1979, pp. 7-8)  
 
  In presenting the pros and cons of each option, Chairman Volcker first mentioned 
that changing operating procedures had occurred to him some time ago. 
Chairman Volcker...I must say that the thought of changing our method of 
operations germinated—in my mind at least—before the market 
psychology or nervousness reached the extreme stage it reached over the 
past week or so. My feeling was that putting even more emphasis on 
meeting the money supply targets and changing operating techniques [in 
order to do so] and thereby changing psychology a bit, we might actually 
get more bang for the buck...I overstate it, but the traditional method of 
making small moves has in some sense, though not completely, run out of 
psychological gas.
 (FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 8)  
 
  He made clear that the choice of the initial borrowing assumption, in principle, 
should be based on the same predicted level of the federal funds rate (converted to a 
spread over the discount rate) that was associated with the projection of near-term M1 
growth matching the FOMC’s target path for that aggregate:  
Chairman Volcker...Suppose we happen to put a lot of weight on the 
current projection of the money supply and pick figures that would closely 
coincide with that. We would then provide, making some assumption on 
the level of borrowing that seemed to be consistent with the level of 
interest rates that presumably laid behind the projection of the money 
supply in the first place—we can’t avoid interest rate assumptions the way 
these things are done—nonborrowed reserves along that path. If the 
money supply actually grew faster, borrowings would go up and 
presumably interest rates would go up; if the reverse happened,   26
borrowings would go down and interest rates would go down. (FOMC 
Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 25) 
 
(Instead, the procedure for giving the FOMC alternative initial borrowing assumptions 
that was put forth in the aforementioned Axilrod-Sternlight memorandum was in fact 
followed in practice for a little longer than a year.) 
  Chairman Volcker said that he could live with either option but again stated that 
in his mind a decision to adopt the second one would be only temporary. 
Chairman Volcker...I am prepared, within the broad parameters, to go with 
whichever way the consensus wants to go so long as the program is strong, 
and if we adopt the new approach so long as we are not locked into it 
indefinitely. If we adopt the new approach, I’d consider it something that 
we adopted that seems particularly suitable to the situation at this time.  
(FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 10)  
 
  The Committee discussed whether a change in procedures would lock it in for a 
considerable period.  
Mr. Eastburn...There’s a credibility problem if we launch this and stop and 
go with it. So I really think we are committed to this if we go [forward]. 
  
Chairman Volcker. Well, I don’t want to accept that. I don’t think we can 
make that decision now. If we [change our operating technique], I do 
accept the fact that to some degree we have prejudiced the discussion we 
will have at the end of the year. We will have to have a reason then to 
move back to the traditional method. But I don’t think we can really make 
that decision now, nor should we. Nor do I think this commits us that 
fully, though it prejudices to some degree what we would do next year.  
(FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 15)  
 
Chairman Volcker...There’s an immediate advantage in the publicity 
{regarding the change in technique}; there is a disadvantage not very far 
down the road if people read this as a commitment and in fact we are not 
going to be able to live up to that commitment.  (FOMC Transcript, 
10/6/1979, p. 27) 
  
  He later noted he preferred that such a decision be reconsidered around year-end,   27
which arose from his sense that money demand historically had been plagued by 
institutional innovation and hence instability. 
Chairman Volcker...That’s the [reason] I’m not willing to make a 
judgment at this point as to the long-run desirability of this technique 
through thick and thin and in all possible circumstances. 
  So, I would remind you that because of the particular 
circumstances I am thinking of using this technique for the [coming] 3- or 
4-month period. This is a time when it may be particularly important to 
our credibility and to the economy and to psychology and everything else 
that we provide ourselves with greater assurance that we will get a handle 
on the money supply.  (FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 28)  
 
  In the course of Committee deliberation, President Roos of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis presented only a limited statement:  
Mr. Roos. Well, Mr. Chairman, I assume that my credibility with you and 
my colleagues would be severely jeopardized if I came out flatly in 
opposition to this proposal! [Laughter] I also was told by my father to 
keep my mouth shut when things are going well. So all I’ll say is briefly: 
God bless you for doing this! [Laughter]  (FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, 
p. 24) 
 
  After Committee discussion, a straw poll was conducted of all the governors and 
presidents. Staying with the traditional method was preferred by five of those present  
(FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 50). However, a majority preferred switching to the 
new technique, and the final official vote was unanimous. 
  Immediately following the FOMC meeting, at 1:30 pm, the Board met to consider 
discount rate and reserve requirement actions. The Board unanimously approved a 1-
percentage-point increase in the basic discount rate, a comparable rise in subsidiary rates, 
and an 8 percent marginal reserve requirement on managed liabilities (BOG Minutes, 
10/6/1979, pp. 1-7). 
  The Board authorized a press release describing all these actions. The press   28
release stated prominently that both the Committee’s as well as the Board’s respective 
votes on the actions taken were unanimous. In characterizing the essence of the new 
technique, the release noted its temporary rationale. 
Actions taken are:...3. A change in the method used to conduct monetary 
policy to support the objective of containing growth in the monetary 
aggregates over the remainder of this year within the ranges previously 
adopted by the Federal Reserve. These ranges are consistent with 
moderate growth in the aggregates over the months ahead. This action 
involves placing greater emphasis in day-to-day operations on the supply 
of bank reserves and less emphasis on confining short-term fluctuations in 
the federal funds rate. (BOG, 1979d, p. 1) 
 
  Then a press conference was scheduled for 6:00 p.m.: 
  
Mr. Volcker: I think in general you know the background of these actions; 
the inflation rate has been moving at an excessive rate and the fact that 
inflation and the anticipations of inflation have been unsettling to markets 
both at home and abroad. That unsettlement in itself and its reflection in 
some commodity markets is, I think, contrary to the basic objective of an 
orderly development of economic activity. (BOG, 1979e, p. 1) 
 
  He indicated that the purpose of the new procedures was to hit the money growth 
ranges for the current year, but any sense that the FOMC had adopted the techniques only 
provisionally was lost on everyone: 
Mr. Volcker. I would emphasize that the broad thrust is to bring monetary 
expansion and credit expansion within the ranges that were established by 
the Federal Reserve a year ago. (BOG, 1979e, p. 2)    
  
  Finally, Chairman Volcker was asked the following about the real-side impact of 
the new initiatives: 
Question: But in immediate terms does it have an effect that will tend to 
slow down economic growth that is already too wishy-washy in this 
country? 
 
Mr. Volcker. Well, you get varying opinions about that. I don’t think it 
will have important effects in that connection. I would be optimistic in the   29
results of these actions. But we’re in an area dealing with economic events 
that are not fully predictable. I think the main thing to say about the 
economy right now is that it is somewhat stronger than anticipated. The 
outlook continues to be, in a general way, that some inventory adjustment 
may be in prospect. I think the best indications that I have now in an 
uncertain world is that it can be accomplished reasonably smoothly. 
(BOG, 1979e, p. 8) 
  
  At a White House press conference the same day, Jody Powell read the following 
official Presidential statement: 
The administration believes that the actions decided upon today by the 
Federal Reserve Board will help reduce inflationary expectations, 
contribute to a stronger U.S. dollar abroad, and curb unhealthy 
speculations in commodity markets. 
  Recent high rates of inflation, led by surging oil prices, other 
economic data, as well as developments in commodity and foreign 
exchange markets, have reinforced the administration’s conviction that 
fighting inflation remains the Nation’s number one economic priority. 
  The administration will continue to emphasize a policy of 
budgetary restraint. Enactment of effective national energy legislation to 
reduce dependence on foreign oil is vital to long-term success in this 
effort.  
  The administration believes that success in reducing inflationary 
pressures will lead in due course both to lower rates of price increases and 
to lower interest rates. (Carter, 1980, p. 1835) 
  
  After the initial events on October 6, Chairman Volcker made several additional 
public appearances to explain the various actions. In a speech to the American Bankers 
Association (ABA) on the morning of Tuesday, October 9, he provided an overview. 
Those measures were specifically designed to provide added assurance 
that the money supply and bank credit expansion would be kept under firm 
control. There will be one seemingly technical, but potentially significant, 
change in procedure in conducting open market operations. More 
emphasis will be placed on limiting the provision of reserves to the 
banking system—which ultimately limits the supply of deposits and 
money—to keep monetary growth within our established targets for this 
year. We have raised the discount rate—and will manage it more 
flexibly—so that restraint on bank reserves will not be offset by excessive 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve Banks. We have placed a special   30
marginal reserve requirement of 8 percent on increases in “managed 
liabilities” of larger banks (including U.S. agencies and branches of 
foreign banks) because that source of funds has financed much of the 
recent buildup in credit expansion. That requirement, admittedly 
cumbersome by its nature, will be maintained so long as credit expansion 
is excessive... 
  As the rate of increase in energy prices subsides—as it should in 
coming months—the inflation rate as a whole should also decline 
appreciably. Looked at another way, the immediate challenge is to avoid 
imbedding the current rate of inflation in expectations and wage and 
pricing decisions, before the current bulge in prices subsides. That is not 
an unrealistic objective, but it is one that will require discipline over the 
months ahead. (Volcker, 1979a, pp. 3, 8) 
 
In that speech, he added, 
 
Attempts to pin all blame for inflation on factors outside our control would 
only doom our efforts to futility. (Volcker, 1979a, p. 8) 
 
That Tuesday morning as well, the WSJ ran a story that included this paragraph: 
Among those who are skeptical that the Fed will really stick to an aggregate 
target is Alan Greenspan president of Townsend-Greenspan & Co., a New 
York economics consultant. Mr. Greenspan who served as chief economic 
advisor to Presidents Nixon and Ford, questions whether, if unemployment 
begins to climb significantly, monetary authorities will have the fortitude to 
“stick to the new policy.”
 7 (WSJ, 1979g, pp. 1, 6)  
  
 The  WSJ published a story the following day, Wednesday, October 10, that 
included additional information: additional meetings were held on October 9. 
Officials of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York held separate 
meetings yesterday with reporters and securities dealers in an effort to 
clear up some of the confusion surrounding details of the Federal 
Reserve’s anti-inflation techniques announced Saturday. 
                                                           
7 While he expressed some doubt as to whether the Federal Reserve would follow through with the 
program, Greenspan was certainly supportive. Indeed, in congressional testimony on November 5, 1979, he 
strongly defended the Federal Reserve: “I thus conclude that for the United States there is little leeway for 
policy maneuvering in the monetary area and that the focus, as it should have been all along, must be on 
defusing underlying inflationary pressures...1980 is likely to be a recession year and high interest rates are 
unquestionably going to exaggerate and prolong any recession. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute 
the interest rate increases to the Federal Reserve. Its options are limited. The problems reflect earlier 
inflationary policies. Unless and until we can reverse them, a restoration of balance in our economy will 
remain illusive” (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 1980, pp. 7-8).   31
  Peter D. Sternlight, Senior Vice President of the New York Fed, 
said he doesn’t know all of the answers yet. “We’re in the midst of a 
learning process ourselves,” he said. “We have some objectives but don’t 
have procedures at this stage.” ... 
  Mr. Sternlight also said the Fed doesn’t plan to be “rigid or 
mechanistic” in pursuit of bank-reserve targets. “This may cause some 
die-hard monetarists to subdue their elation at our change in approach and 
recall their congratulatory messages,” he said... 
  When a reporter asked what rates the public should watch for clues 
to Fed thinking, Mr. Sternlight replied: “I’m not sure I have a ready 
substitute to proffer at this point.” He emphasized that “we’re still very 
much experimental” at this stage.  
  Mr. Sternlight said one key figure the Fed would pay attention to is 
“nonborrowed reserves.” But he emphasized that the Fed won’t rely 
exclusively on this and plans to remain flexible in its approach. (WSJ, 
1979h, p. 3) 
 
  Besides not reassuring the dealers (Melton, 1985, p. 49), this briefing content was 
received with a certain displeasure at the Board in Washington, as it seemed to 
undermine both the Federal Reserve’s commitment to the new approach and the care with 
which the new procedures had been thought-through in advance (David Lindsey’s 
recollection). 
 
  On Wednesday, the day that the above story was published, “a Fed official,” 
perhaps Chairman Volcker, spoke to the WSJ, which published the following story: 
As markets gyrated in the uncertainty following the Federal Reserve 
Board’s weekend policy switch, a Fed official warned that the central bank 
will continue to be unpredictable. 
  “Anybody looking for a rule of thumb is going to be frustrated,” 
the official said in an interview that sketched a picture of a more 
flexible—and probably tougher—Fed.  
  “There are still going to have to be policy judgments made,” the 
official said, indicating the central bank “isn’t going to trap itself by 
following any rule.” He said the Fed will try to steer between the “two 
extremes” of its old practice of inching the federal funds rate up and down 
and “letting the funds rate go anyplace forever.”... 
  The Reserve Board official observed that the markets were 
“scrambling” for clues to get a “more definite” picture of the Reserve 
Board’s future behavior. But he added “There isn’t any sense in 
scrambling. It doesn’t exist. We changed the procedure. What the limits 
are going to be aren’t clear yet.” (Conderacci, 1979, p. 3) 
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The WSJ reported that reactions among monetarists varied widely. Some were jubilant:  
Overcast skies here yesterday did little to dampen the spirits of Laurence K. 
Roos... 
  Although the bank was closed because of Columbus Day, Mr. 
Roos was in his office in downtown St. Louis, and he was beaming. 
“Except for the unfortunate coincidence of the holiday, champagne and 
beer would be flowing in the aisles here,” he says with a broad smile. 
(Garino, 1979, p. 6) 
 
But feelings of euphoria did not extend to monetarists in academia.  
 
As more details of the Fed’s program emerge from talks with Fed 
officials, some financial experts believe the Fed will continue to encounter 
difficulties trying to rein in the growth of the money supply... 
  Nevertheless, Fed officials say they believe they can enforce and 
execute their program announced Saturday evening. They acknowledge, 
though, that some aspects are so new that they don’t have all the details 
worked out yet... 
  Separately, some economists were disheartened by remarks made 
by Peter D. Sternlight...that “we don’t plan to be rigid or mechanistic” in 
pursuit of bank reserve targets and will continue looking at many other 
factors. 
  That worries Allan H. Meltzer, an economics professor at 
Carnegie-Mellon University. He says that the Fed may try to fine-tune 
more items than it has the power to do and that the money supply may get 
out of control. He urges the Fed to focus on the “monetary base”...“I 
didn’t send them a congratulatory telegram,” he says. “I’m going to hold 
my breath and hope they don’t screw it up.” (Herman, 1979, p. 6) 
 
Another story continued in the same vein: 
 
Together with Allan H. Meltzer... Professor [Karl] Brunner six years ago 
set up the Shadow Open Market Committee, a group...that meets twice a 
year to appraise the work of the Fed’s key policymaking group. The 
verdict more often than not has been unfavorable.    
    Prof. Brunner up to now sees no reason to change... 
  Politics aside, monetarists question whether the Federal Reserve 
has chosen the best operating technique... 
  According to the Federal Reserve plan, estimates for nonborrowed 
reserves will largely determine what the Fed does as it tries to hit its 
desired monetary growth rate. Prof. Brunner wonders why the system does 
not simplify its task by focusing solely on the monetary base. Statistical 
studies, he says, have shown that the relationship between the base and the   33
gross national product has been smooth and predictable since World War 
II. Prof. Brunner is quick to admit that Mr. Volcker sounds much better 
than some of his immediate predecessors. The new chairman has been 
much more willing to concede that the Fed deserves much of the blame for 
the existing inflation. He stresses that the important need now is not just to 
articulate a new policy but to stick with it... 
  But monetarists have been burned so often that for now they will 
withhold their cheers. Securities markets seem similarly skeptical that the 
Fed finally is determined to stop inflation... (Clark, 1979, p. 22)   
  
   To further explain the FOMC’s actions, Chairman Volcker appeared on the 
MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour on October 10. His first comment reacted to the earlier view 
of experts that, as a newly appointed Federal Reserve Chairman, he wouldn‘t make any 
radical changes.  
Paul Volcker: Well, I don’t know that these are radical changes in Federal 
Reserve policy in a very fundamental sense. We want to deal with this 
problem of inflation, and I think that intention was perhaps reinforced in 
the public mind by the actions we took on Saturday; but in a very basic 
sense the policy has been there and we intend to carry it out. (MacNeil-
Lehrer News Hour, 1979, p. 1) 
     
  Commenting on the market reaction, he went on to underscore the point that the 
Federal Reserve was determined to bring down both actual and expected inflation: 
Paul Volcker:  I think the point may be that we captured their 
attention...and I think that’s constructive in a sense, because there’ve been 
a lot of doubts, a lot of anxiety that this inflation was going to get out of 
control. And it’s not going to get out control if we do our job...[A] lot of 
people were skeptical whether we could deal with it. I hope they’re less 
skeptical now than they were before... (MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, 1979, 
p. 2) 
 
He stressed the long-run, rather than short-run, effect on real economic activity. 
 
Paul Volcker: And this is the kind of circumstance which leads to concern 
about recession; and I share that concern. But...[i]f inflation got out of 
hand, it’s quite clear that that would be the greatest threat to the continuing 
growth of the economy, to the productivity of the economy, to the 
investment environment, and ultimately to employment...Now, I’m not   34
saying that unemployment will not rise. I am saying the greater threat over 
a period of time would come from failing to deal with inflation rather than 
efforts to deal with it. (MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, 1979, p. 6-7) 
 
In a subsequent appearance on Issues and Answers on October 29, he spoke further: 
 
Mr. Volcker: We are in a very difficult economic situation, but I would 
not, in terms of a possible recession, which has been discussed for months, 
trace that to our particular actions. The situation we had was rising 
inflation, speculation, a weak dollar. (ABC News’ Issues and Answers, 
1979, p. 2) 
 
  On October 17, before the Joint Economic Committee, Chairman Volcker dealt in 
more detail with the effect on public attitudes of the “serious inflationary environment we 
are now facing.” 
...An entire generation of young adults has grown up since the mid-1960s 
knowing only inflation, indeed an inflation that has seemed to accelerate 
inexorably. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many citizens 
have begun to wonder whether it is realistic to anticipate a return to 
general price stability, and have begun to change their behavior 
accordingly. Inflation feeds in part on itself. So part of the job of returning 
to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip 
of inflationary expectations. 
  We have recently seen clear evidence of the pervasive influence of 
inflationary expectations on the orderly functioning of financial and 
commodity markets, and on the value of the dollar internationally. Over a 
longer period of time, the uncertainties and distortions inherent in inflation 
have a debilitating influence on investment, productivity and growth. In 
the circumstances, the overwhelming feeling in the nation—that we must 
come to grips with the problem—reflects the common sense of the 
American people. At the same time, we have to recognize that, after more 
than four years of expansion, there are widespread anticipations of 
inventory adjustments and a downturn in economic activity. The challenge 
is to deal with this troublesome situation in a manner that promises, over a 
period of time, to restore a solid base for sustained growth and 
stability...Above all, the new measures should make abundantly clear our 
unwillingness to finance a continuing inflationary process. (Volcker, 
1979b, 1-2, 4)  
  
  Before the National Press Club early in 1980, he underlined these monetary   35
sources of sustained inflation. 
Our policy, taken in a longer perspective, rests on a simple premise— one 
documented by centuries of experience—that the inflationary process is 
ultimately related to excessive growth in money and credit. I do not mean 
to suggest that the relationship is so close, or that economic reality is so 
simple, that we can simply set a monetary dial and relax...But, with all the 
complications, I do believe that moderate, non-inflationary growth in 
money and credit, sustained over a period of time, is an absolute 
prerequisite for dealing with the inflation that has ravaged the dollar, 
undermined our economic performance and prospects, and disturbed our 
society itself. (Volcker, 1980a, pp. 3-4) 
 
  Chairman Volcker contended on January 15, 1980, that poor forecasts can 
undermine anti-inflationary policy. 
[I]t’s a dangerous game to change basic policies on the basis of short-term 
forecasts at any particular point in time. Forecasts of the short-run outlook 
are so often fallible that they’re almost as apt to be wrong as right. 
  In the past, in shaping our nation’s policies, I think we’ve had an 
insidious tendency to anticipate the worst in terms of unemployment in 
particular; and we always anticipate the worst and act on those 
anticipations over time. That’s a recipe for too much expansionary action 
and ultimately for inflation. Today our margins for error in that connection 
are less than they have ever been and I think that we should not make that 
mistake again. (Volcker, 1980e, p. 42) 
 
Then, before the Joint Economic Committee on February 1, he noted 
 
...the almost universal failure of forecasts made at this time last year, and 
throughout most of the year, to predict accurately the continued expansion 
of economic activity in 1979. Despite the shocks from very large oil price 
hikes, fuel shortages, and major strikes, as well as the imposition of 
restraining macroeconomic policies, the economy proved to be remarkably 
resilient. Growth in real economic activity did slow in 1979 from the 
unsustainable 5 percent rate posted in the preceding year, but real GNP 
still advanced 1 percent over the four quarters of 1979; the much-heralded 
recession never appeared. 
  The 1979 experience underscores how limited our ability is to 
project future developments. It reinforces the wisdom of holding firmly to 
monetary and other economic policies directed toward the evident 
continuing problems of the economy—of which inflation ranks first—
rather than reacting to possibly transitory and misleading movements in   36
the latest statistics or relying too heavily on uncertain economic and 
financial forecasts. In retrospect, recharting policy to respond to tentative 
signs of a faltering economy last year would have proven extremely costly 
to our anti-inflation effort. (Volcker, 1980b, p. 76) 
 
  In his first Humphrey-Hawkins testimony on February 19, 1980, Chairman 
Volcker amplified his critique of approaching monetary policy in such a way. 
In the past, at critical junctures for economic stabilization policy, we have 
usually been more preoccupied with the possibility of near-term weakness 
in economic activity or other objectives than with the implications of our 
actions for future inflation. To some degree, that has been true even during 
the long period of expansion since 1975. As a consequence, fiscal and 
monetary policies alike too often have been prematurely or excessively 
simulative or insufficiently restrictive. The result has been our now 
chronic inflationary problem, with a growing conviction on the part of 
many that this process is likely to continue. Anticipations of higher prices 
themselves help speed the inflationary process... 
  The broad objective of policy must be to break that ominous 
pattern. That is why dealing with inflation has properly been elevated to a 
position of high national priority. Success will require that policy be 
consistently and persistently oriented to that end. Vacillation and 
procrastination, out of fears of recession or otherwise, would run grave 
risks. Amid the present uncertainties, stimulative policies could well be 
misdirected in the short run. More importantly, far from assuring more 
growth over time, by aggravating the inflationary process and psychology, 
they would threaten more instability and unemployment. (Volcker, 1980d, 
pp. 2-3) 
 
The reception given to the new operating procedures at the February 
Humphrey-Hawkins hearings by the House and Senate banking committees was 
generally, though not universally, welcoming. The House Committee on Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs was chaired by Representative Henry Reuss, a 
Democrat from Wisconsin.  Despite his support, the tone of the other 
representatives was mixed. Even so, the congressional committee’s monetary-
policy report, published in April, approved of “a cautious moderation of monetary   37
growth in 1980 and into the future for some years to come.” The report called the 
new operating procedures “a change we applaud” and even recommended 
contemporaneous reserve requirements! (U.S. House of Representatives, 1980c, 
pp. 2-4). William Proxmire, a Democrat from Wisconsin, although an 
independent maverick, was chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs. He approved of the “aggressive” policy under 
Chairman Volcker. He even noted “continuing doubts that the Federal Reserve 
will continue to pursue a tight monetary policy in a Presidential election year.” 
The only other senator to address the issue, Jake Garn, a Utah Republican, also 
took an anti-inflationary position (U.S. Senate, 1980, pp. 1-3).  
On a more technical level, an official summary of the operational details of the 
new procedures, dated January 30, 1980, appeared as an appendix to both testimonies by 
Chairman Volcker, on February 1 and February 19, as well as to another of his 
testimonies on February 4, 1980 (Volcker, 1980c). This document identified and 
described in detail eight separate steps constituting the procedures. It also discussed  
...how the linkage between reserves and money involved in the procedures 
is influenced by the existing institutional framework and other 
factors...The exact relationship depends on the behavior of other factors 
besides money that absorb or release reserves, and consideration must also 
be given to timing problems in connection with lagged reserve accounting. 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 1980a, p. 1) 
 
  This document was released only after the Committee discussed on January 8, 
1980, whether to continue with the new procedures. Chairman Volcker began the 
discussion; it cannot be said that the Committee’s decision turned into a suspenseful 
cliffhanger:   38
Chairman Volcker...I just want to be explicit about whether we want to 
continue this general type of procedure. Obviously, we’re on it and it has 
worked; on the surface, anyway, it has worked. The results are more or 
less in line with what was intended. And I think it continues to have some 
of the advantages that were foreseen originally. While we still worry about 
what the federal funds rate is doing, when it doesn’t go according to our 
preconception, we at least avoid making a concrete decision— ... 
  {A}s a broad thrust, I think the question is whether or not to 
continue basically what we’ve been doing. 
  
  Mr. Partee. Shifting back from a very successful experiment 
certainly would be hard to explain. 
 
  Chairman Volcker. There’s no question. 
 
  Mr. Morris. The reaction would be devastating. 
 
  Mr. Partee. It surely would. 
 
  Mr. Balles. Unthinkable.  (FOMC Transcript, 1/8-9/1980, pp. 13-
14) 
  
Despite the technical description, some confusion about the new procedures 
persisted. Governor Wallich expressed the point a month after the description was first 
released as follows: 
The new procedures of the Federal Reserve have given rise to some 
understandable misconceptions that suggest that the Federal Reserve has 
not been fully effective in making itself understood. (Wallich, 1980, p. 9) 
 
WHY? 
 
  Looked at from a deeper perspective than mere historical narrative, the question 
can be asked as to the reasons for the FOMC’s adoption of the new operating 
procedures—that is, why? Roughly in order of decreasing obviousness, the reasons range 
as follows:  
(1)  restoring more certain public confidence in the Federal Reserve    39
(2)  by allowing more certain restraint over long-term inflation,  
(3)  by more clearly abandoning a policy strategy of “gradualism” and  
(4)  by gaining more certain control over intermediate-term money growth,  
(5)  by clearly switching from the federal funds rate on the money-demand 
side to nonborrowed reserves on the money-supply side as the short-run 
operating target,  
(6)  thereby permitting the federal funds rate more certain short-run flexibility 
to attain the needed level in terms both of monetary and inflationary 
developments,  
(7)  thereby more clearly distancing the FOMC from the particular day-to-day 
level of the federal funds rate and  
(8)  thereby clearly moving away from a deliberative smooth adjustment of the 
funds rate and  
(9)  thereby clearly avoiding any reliance on uncertain FOMC estimates of 
potential output or the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU) and 
(10)  thereby clearly avoiding any reliance on uncertain FOMC forecasts of 
output, employment, and inflation and  
(11)  thereby clearly assuming full central bank responsibility for the attainment 
of long-term price stability, but also  
(12)  thereby more clearly avoiding difficult questions of overt responsibility 
for intermediate-term real-side developments.   40
Point One 
 
The historical narrative in the last section helped to demonstrate that the media 
commentary and commodity market reaction to the revelation on September 18 of the 
Board’s four-to-three discount-rate vote—without the disclosure of the FOMC’s 
tightening and the accompanying three dissents for even tighter policy—worked together 
to pound a fatal stake in the credibility of the FOMC as the country’s bulwark against 
inflation. Had the public and the markets received the full picture, then the reaction 
would very likely have been more subdued. Restoring the public’s trust in the System 
became a paramount end for any actions that the FOMC would contemplate. 
Point Two  
According to the narrative history in the previous section, by October 6, 
1979, the FOMC evidently had come to view rampant inflation and inflationary 
expectations as the nation’s most serious problem. Judging by actual events, the time 
had come for dramatic action by the Federal Reserve to counter the inflationary threat 
to the nation’s economy. This action would need to be sustained long enough to reduce 
inflation substantially as well as strengthen public attitudes about the central bank’s 
resolve to do so, because intense inflationary forces and unhinged inflationary 
expectations were seen to be detrimental to real-side activity. In the strength of its view, 
upon which it was willing to act decisively, the FOMC was far ahead of its time. 
Indeed, entering the 1970s, quite the opposite opinion prevailed, to wit, that some 
inflation was needed to “grease the wheels” of the market system. Only after the long 
economic expansions of the last seven years of the 1980s and the last eight years of the   41
1990s did the damaging effects of inflation rates and expected rates of inflation above 
low single digits on saving, investment, and productivity become demonstrable.  
 
Point Three  
  A strategy of “gradualism” had characterized the FOMC’s monetary policy 
during the 1970s, but the inadequacy of such a strategy had become all too evident as 
1979 progressed. By the time of its 1979 Annual Report on August 3, the International 
Monetary Fund put it this way: 
...In the Fund’s 1976 Annual Report, the importance of bringing down inflation 
and greatly reducing inflationary expectations was stressed. A “gradual” 
approach was recommended—but one that “would need to be adhered to 
firmly.” ... 
  Now, three years later, it is clear that the suggested strategy of 
policy has not led to satisfactory results; for the industrial countries, 
average rates of inflation and unemployment have not been reduced. The 
reasons for this unsatisfactory outturn are manifold and complex, but 
perhaps the basic one has been the pursuit of policies that have failed to 
make a dent in inflationary expectations. It is evident that governments 
have felt severe economic and political constraints in launching an 
effective anti-inflation program, since in the short run this would be bound 
to have adverse employment effects whose timing and magnitude would 
depend primarily on the ability to reduce inflationary expectations and 
hence would be difficult to predict. Also noteworthy is that economic 
forecasting and policymaking have been subject to a substantial degree of 
error in the unaccustomed situation of “stagflation”—an error often 
compounded, however understandably, by official optimism toward the 
future or misleading assessments of past developments... 
  The upshot has been that “gradualism” as an approach to the 
reduction of inflation and inflationary expectations has been too 
“gradual”—in many countries, to the point of no reduction at all. This 
seems clearly evident from the fact that the overall rate of monetary 
expansion in the industrial countries has not come down, but has remained 
about 10 per cent in every year since 1975... (IMF, 1979, p. 7) 
 
The historical narrative in the previous section suggests that on October 6, the 
FOMC acted on the same perception. The Committee clearly had become frustrated with   42
the upward march of inflation despite its previous gradualist policy put in place to resist 
the trend.  
Point Four 
  As will be discussed more fully in Point Eleven below, Federal Reserve officials 
had long accorded a significant role in the inflation process to excessive monetary 
stimulus, along with the important effects imparted by “exogenous factors” that also 
affected measured inflation. As shall be seen in that discussion, however, Chairman 
Burns had questioned the practical ability of monetary policy to resist the various 
pressures acting against sufficient monetary restraint to maintain price stability. In 
opposition to that view, the position of the monetarists had the intellectual attraction of 
purity—that, on a sustained basis, “inflation was always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon.” This argument had a universal acidity that dissolved all other influences 
on long-term inflation, except for money growth. And the appreciable rise of actual 
inflation in association with often above-target money growth brought ever-widening 
support for the monetarist argument that the culprit was none other than the Federal 
Reserve itself. Accordingly, it was ever-more generally perceived that controlling money 
growth was a prerequisite for controlling inflation. 
  That money growth had been excessively rapid entering the fall of 1979 could not 
really be questioned. In the third quarter of the year, the levels of M1 and M2, 
respectively, were 1 ½ percentage points below of the upper bounds of their 3 to 6 
percent and 5 to 8 percent ranges for the year only because of the their low –2.1 percent 
and 1.8 percent rates of change recorded in the first quarter. With M1 and M2,   43
respectively,,  growing at rates of 7.6 percent and 9.5 percent and of 8.6 percent and 11.9 
percent in the second and third quarters, respectively, the Axilrod-Sternlight 
memorandum informed the FOMC that  
...rates of growth have been accelerating and have been above the longer-
run ranges, well above most recently... 
  For the monetary aggregates as a group to be within their ranges by 
the time the year is over, a considerable slowing from their recent pace is 
required.
 (Axilrod and Sternlight, 1979, p. 2) 
 
  Taking a longer perspective, the two upper panels of Figure 5 show that over each 
of the last four years of the decade of the 1970s, either M1 or M2 growth exceeded the 
upper bound of its announced annual range.
8 This experience, of course, had added 
empirical support for the contention that a causal link connected money growth and 
inflation. A decade after the procedural change, Stephen Axilrod summarized the 
approach: 
The obvious problem—it was an easy period in that sense—was to control 
inflation. One way to do it was to impose an M1 rule on yourself, pay little 
attention to GNP forecasts, and just let the economy adjust...[The FOMC] 
used M1 successfully as that sort of bludgeon to receive a rapid reduction 
in inflation... (Axilrod, 1990, pp. 578-79) 
 
  Monetarists buttressed their case by contending that monetary targeting on a 
consistent basis over time—that is, without “base drift”—would take advantage of the 
longer-run predictability of the velocity of money. Karl Brunner had underscored concern 
about base drift under the old operating procedures: 
It [the Shadow Open Market Committee] also warned that the Federal 
Reserve’s internal procedures were ill suited to execute an effective 
monetary control. The traditional mode of implementing policy would 
remain, in the Shadow Committee’s view, an uncertain and unreliable 
                                                           
8 This figure is reproduced from Lindsey (1986, p. 177, Exhibit 5-1).   44
instrument for the purposes defined by House Concurrent Resolution 133. 
The Committee emphasized, moreover, the potential drift built into 
monetary growth as a result of the peculiar targeting techniques evolved 
by the Federal Reserve Authorities. (Brunner, 1977, p. 2) 
 
 Effective  monetary  control  would ensure, monetarists said, that prices would stay 
stable on average over time and therefore that inflation expectations at more distant 
horizons would be anchored at a low level. They contended that several economic 
advantages would flow from such a situation. They also argued that high and volatile 
inflation and inflation expectations made reliance on an interest rate as the main 
operating target for monetary policy even more problematic than it already was 
otherwise. After all, the significance for spending of a particular nominal interest rate was 
degraded as uncertainty rose about the true level of the real interest rate and as 
speculative investment gained in importance.  
 Point Five  
  A separate argument of monetarism was how to control money growth, asserting 
that the monetary base or total reserves should be used as the operating target.
9 As the 
Shadow Open Market Committee (SOMC) expressed the point in early February 1980, 
The SOMC favors an immediate return to the 6% growth rate for base 
money that was achieved in the first and second quarters of 1978. A 6% 
average rate of growth of the base in each quarter of 1980 will continue 
the policy we advocated at our September 1979 meeting. (SOMC, 1980, p. 
6-7) 
  
  This monetarist argument was rejected by FOMC staff, which drew on a different 
strand of the literature to recommend nonborrowed reserves as the primary alternative 
                                                           
9 See, for example, Johannes and Rasche (1979, 1980, 1981). Table 1 in the 1981 paper translates the “New 
Federal Reserve Technical Procedures for Controlling Money” into the money multiplier framework used 
by monetarists.   45
operating target to the federal funds rate. But this strand of the literature did not contend 
that as a technical matter nonborrowed reserves were superior to the federal funds rate in 
an empirical horserace in which each approach was used optimally in setting an operating 
target based on the expected outcome for the money stock; rather, in such a case the two 
were virtually dead even in controlling money (Sivesand and Hurley, 1980; Axilrod and 
Lindsey, 1981). 
  Instead, what tipped the scales in favor of nonborrowed reserves was the practical 
observation that a monetary authority deliberately setting the funds rate would be 
unlikely to select the level that it expected to induce the targeted money stock because the 
implied volatility of the funds rate would be more than the authority could stomach. 
Because of what Governor Wallich called “inertia in the adjustment of the funds rate to 
needed levels under the old procedure,” a nonborrowed reserves operating target was 
thought likely to work out better in practice in controlling money (Wallich, 1980, p. 5).  
Even if the authority chose an initial level that would not give rise to the appropriate 
funds rate for the targeted money growth, then further automatic movement of the funds 
rate within the control period but outside the authority’s discretion was believed likely to 
deliver monetary growth closer to its target than in the case of a funds rate operating 
target where the initial level was simply maintained. Over time, closer monetary 
management would imply that inflation would be brought under more certain restraint as 
well. 
Point Six 
The Committee recognized that the switch to a reserves-based approach to   46
monetary control would be more likely to allow the federal funds rate in the short run to 
move as necessary to whatever level would prove consistent with more restrained money 
growth and lower inflation. But given that the appropriate level, as well as the induced 
automatic movement, could not be known in advance by the monetary authority, for the 
federal funds rate to have the scope to be significantly more variable, the Committee 
would have to establish a substantially wider permissible band of funds rate movement. 
This band, which was published in the directive, is portrayed in the lower panel of Figure 
5 introduced in Point Four. On October 6, the Committee widened this band from ½  
percentage point to 4 percentage points. The small crosses in that panel, which depict the 
average federal funds rate between FOMC meetings, also suggest that federal funds in 
fact began trading over a much wider range. 
  Figure 6 offers an alternative perspective: A standard forward-looking Taylor rule 
has a tendency to predict a funds rate from early 1976 through mid-1979 that not only 
exhibited fairly subdued movements but also came reasonably close to the actual funds 
rate set by the FOMC. (Figure 6, it should be noted, does not even employ the effects of a 
lagged funds rate to capture the “interest rate smoothing” that the Committee 
unquestionably put in place along with its reaction to forecasts of inflation and real 
economic activity over virtually all of the decade of the 1970s [Orphanides, 2002]). The 
figure’s Taylor rule uses Greenbook forecasts of inflation relative to an assumed 2 
percent target and of real GNP relative to the real-time estimates of potential output, as 
described in Orphanides (2003b.) Other than its reliance on forecasts and data available 
in real time to the FOMC for its policy deliberations, it follows Taylor’s (1993) classic   47
parameterization, including the coefficients he originally suggested for the Committee’s 
responsiveness to inflation and the output gap and his assumption of 2 percent for the 
equilibrium real funds rate. Numerous studies over the past decade have suggested that 
adherence to such a policy rule should represent rather good, if not optimal, monetary 
policy and should be expected to deliver reasonably good macroeconomic performance.
10 
By this rationale, and since the Committee’s actions up until the summer of 1979 line up 
well with the Taylor rule prescriptions, policy should have been considered successful. 
However, it is precisely this reasoning that highlights the fragility of supposedly efficient 
Taylor rule prescriptions. The strategy of exact adherence to this rule would not have 
delivered much better outcomes than the policy in place before the reforms of October. 
And adherence after October 1979 would have prevented the tightening necessary for 
controlling inflation. Adoption of the new operating procedures shifted policy away from 
the pitfalls of the unreliable guidance suggested by the Taylor rule.  
Point Seven  
Chairman Volcker explained in 1992 that he did not believe that he would have 
been able to get the FOMC to accept overtly the increase in the funds rate that ultimately 
proved necessary to rein in inflationary money growth: 
...the general level of interest rates reached higher levels than I or any of 
my colleagues had really anticipated. That, in a perverse way, was one 
benefit of the new technique; assuming that those levels of interest were 
necessary to manage the money supply, I would not have had support for 
deliberately raising short-term rates that much. (Volcker and Gyohten, 
1992, p. 170)                   
  
  Indeed, Chairman Volcker realized this potential difficulty with deliberate 
                                                           
10 See, for example, the studies in Taylor (1999).   48
tightening in real time. Greider wrote,  
Early in his tenure, Volcker had directed the senior staff to begin technical 
studies on changing the Fed’s basic operating method, and after the 
embarrassment of the board’s 4-3 vote on September 18, Volcker pushed 
the idea more aggressively. (Greider, 1987, p. 105) 
     
Joseph B. Treaster put the point slightly differently in his book published in 2004: 
 
In the middle of his second month as Fed Chairman, Volcker began 
developing a strategy for implementing what would be the single most 
important decision of his career. His insight, triggered by the reaction to 
the close vote, was that as confident as he felt at the moment, there might 
very well be a point, before inflation had been stopped, at which a 
majority at the Fed would say, No more. “When you have to make an 
explicit decision about interest rates all the time,” Volcker said years later, 
“people don’t like to do it. You’re always kind of playing catch-up. I 
wanted to discipline ourselves.” 
  His solution, which now seems breathtakingly simple, was to take 
the cutting-edge decision out of the hands of the members of the Fed—or 
at least make it seem that way... (Treaster, 2004, pp. 147-48)       
 
  As Henry Wallich noted soon after the FOMC adopted the new procedures: 
 
At the policy level, the reserve-based procedure has the advantage of 
minimizing the need for Federal Reserve decisions concerning the funds 
rate. Interest rates become a byproduct, as it were, of the money-supply 
process. (Wallich, 1980, p. 4)  
 
  William Greider quoted Governors Teeters, Rice, and Partee as to the 
desirability of automatic interest rate movements and their tendency to distance 
the outcome from the monetary authority’s discretion:  
  “Under the new system,” Nancy Teeters observed, “we could say 
what we were doing was concentrating on the monetary aggregates.  It 
was perfectly obvious to me that if you set the money growth too low, that 
would send interest rates up. That was never in doubt. The problem with 
targeting the Fed Funds rate is that you had to set it. This did let us step 
back a bit.” 
  Emmett Rice, who had joined the board four months earlier, had 
questioned interest-rate targeting himself, convinced that it would make 
more sense to control reserves directly...“This meant you were not directly   49
responsible for what happened to interest rates. This was one of the 
advantages. If interest rates had to go to 20 percent—and I have to say that 
nobody thought they would go that high—then this would be the 
procedure doing it. I wouldn’t call it a cover, but I don’t think anyone on 
the committee would have been willing to vote to push interest rates as 
high as 20 percent. This was a way to achieve a result, a more effective 
way to get there.” 
  Chuck Partee, the other reluctant “dove,” was attracted to the 
operating shift by a different argument. Partee was not a monetarist 
himself, but he thought that the monetarist approach might overcome a 
flaw in the Fed’s institutional reflexes—sticking stubbornly with a strong 
position too long and causing more damage to the economy than it had 
intended... 
   “It may sound odd, but I would prefer the evenhanded approach of 
the monetarists. I became very concerned about a mind-set that would lead 
us right in to a recession—get tight and stay tight...I found myself far less 
hostile to the notion that we might have a fairer approach by targeting the 
money supply than I was to the idea that we should raise interest rates one 
time and keep raising them. The problem is, there is also a hesitancy to 
reduce interest rates once they have been raised. My concern grew out of 
my reflection on several earlier recessions, particularly 1974-1975. My 
concern was that we would be slow to respond to weakness and permit a 
substantial contraction in money and credit to occur. There would be a 
great chance of that, that we might just get locked into a position of 
holding tight for a rather extended period.” (Greider, 1987, pp. 111-12) 
  
Point Eight 
 
   Stephen Axilrod explained the import of the FOMC’s implicit decision to 
renounce interest rate smoothing some 15 years after the new procedures were adopted: 
…the Great Inflation [of the 1970s]...came about because of an interaction 
of a culture of extreme policy caution and a number of unanticipated 
changes in the economic environment. That is, in the culture of the time 
the policy instrument, say, the funds rate, was adjusted very carefully—
slowly and in small increments...In that context you can think about the 
policy of 1979-82 as an effort to break the culture of extreme policy 
caution. (Axilrod, 1996, p. 232-33) 
     
Point Nine  
  After October 6, 1979, the FOMC set, and published in the policy record, short-  50
run targets for money growth over the three months ending in the last month of the 
current quarter, based on the desired approach to the annual ranges that were announced 
in February and July in accord with the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. With the nonborrowed 
reserves path derived from these targets along with the Committee’s initial borrowing 
assumption, the evolution of the actual federal funds rate between FOMC meetings 
would depend primarily on money stock developments relative to the targets over that 
period.  
  This process obviously has nothing to do with Committee estimates of the 
NAIRU or of the associated estimates of potential output, nor does it have anything to do 
with gaps of unemployment or output from “full employment” levels. Actually, from a 
money-demand perspective, outcomes for the growth of the money stock in the current 
quarter have more to do with the growth of output ending in the current quarter than with 
an output gap (see, in particular, Orphanides, 2003b, Section 2.5). As Orphanides has 
pointed out, misestimates of the NAIRU and potential output and the associated 
misestimates of the unemployment and output gaps were primary causes of the inflation 
of the 1970s (Orphanides, 2002, 2003a). Thus, it is understandable that the FOMC 
implicitly forswore gap analysis in the fall of 1979 (Orphanides, 2004; Orphanides and 
Williams, 2004).  
  Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of the gap-analysis-based dilemma. As 
seen in the middle panel, based on the available estimates of potential supply, actual 
output had fallen well short of potential output and the gap was projected to deteriorate   51
even before the fears of recession appeared on the horizon in 1979.
11 This slack alone 
should have eventually led to a gradual easing of inflationary pressures, which can be 
seen in the forecast of inflation in the top panel. Throughout 1979, this reasoning 
suggested that holding back on tightening policy appeared to provide a reasonable 
balance of the Committee’s objectives, affording gradual disinflation and economic 
expansion. In retrospect, the 1979 estimates of potential proved overly optimistic, 
explaining why the policy prescriptions from this gap-based analysis were overly 
expansionary. But this was not recognized at the time. Continued adherence to gap-based 
analysis would have prolonged the policy of inappropriate, even if inadvertent, monetary 
ease. The policy reform in October short-circuited this process.   
Point Ten  
  The monetary policy process of short-run money targeting also is not explicitly 
dependent on the longer-term economic forecasts of the Board members and Reserve 
Bank presidents. Although their sense of the outlook implicitly could affect the 
Committee’s money targets, initial borrowing assumption, and choice for the funds rate 
band, the influence of opinions about the future course over the actual course of the 
federal funds rate is clearly less direct than with a federal funds operating target in which 
the Committee sets its operating objective based in important part on its opinion of the 
outlook.  
  This much looser connection between the stance of policy and the uncertain 
economic forecasts of FOMC members is, of course, consistent with Chairman Volcker’s 
                                                           
11 Potential output is from Council of Economic Advisors (1979, p. 75). This estimate, which was prepared 
in February 1979, was also employed by Federal Reserve staff as its estimate throughout 1979.    52
denigration of the accuracy of any economic forecasts that was cited above as well as 
Axilrod’s earlier observation that after the adoption of the new techniques the FOMC 
avoided basing policy on forecasts. The new operating procedures, with their dependence 
on near-term outcomes for money, guaranteed that error-prone longer-term economic 
projections of both prices and real GNP would not interfere with the coming battle 
against virulent and entrenched inflation.  
   The Board staff’s economic projection in mid-1979 did not offer an accurate 
outlook for real growth. Figure 7 confirms that, by July 1979, the Greenbook was 
predicting that a recession had begun by the second quarter of 1979, as clearly shown by 
the forecasted decline in the level of real GNP through the end of the year. (In retrospect, 
real GNP instead is known to have registered positive growth in each quarter of the 
second half of that year.) The lower panel of Figure 7 displays the associated staff 
prediction of a sharp rise in unemployment through the end of 1980. As a result of the 
projections by the time of the July Greenbook of steep increases in the output and 
employment gaps, along with moderating energy prices, average four-quarter deflator 
inflation was foreseen to abate appreciably in 1980, after spiking through 1979. 
   The staff had established a history of excessive optimism in forecasting inflation 
in the 1970s. Figure 8 demonstrates this record visually. It presents for the 1970s the 
successive underpredictions of the average four-quarter rate of inflation in the deflator in 
mid-quarter Greenbooks—plotted in the quarter of that Greenbook’s publication—three 
quarters in advance of the last predicted quarter, as in the Taylor rule shown in Point Six. 
The bias in the inflation forecasts, of course, is closely related to the overly optimistic   53
measures of potential supply discussed in Point Nine. The inflation forecasts were 
systematically lower than they should have been simply because of the persistent 
perceptions of economic slack that was not actually there. The evidence had not yet been 
assembled showing that basing inflation forecasts on real-time estimates of the output gap 
may be unreliable (Orphanides and van Norden, 2003). 
Point Eleven  
  With its actions on October 6, the Committee fully assumed its unique 
responsibility for the attainment of long-term price stability. To understand the nature of 
this change, it is necessary to discuss the attitudes of previous  FOMCs.     
  Under Chairman Burns, the common thread running through many 
communications on monetary policy was that the Federal Reserve and other critical 
influences ultimately shared responsibility for the too-rapid rise in prices. Excessive 
fiscal deficits were a commonly referenced contributing source. The cost-push effect of 
union power through wage negotiations also was regarded as playing an important role, 
as was corporate discretion over administered product prices. After mid-decade, OPEC’s 
cartel-like pricing was thought to influence not just relative prices but also overall trend 
inflation. By the 1970s, the economics profession had advanced sufficiently that most 
FOMC members had accepted a vertical long-run Phillips curve in which the equilibrium 
unemployment rate was independent of the inflation rate. Rather, despite rousing anti-
inflationary speeches and testimony, the Federal Reserve had not really taken to heart its 
own sole responsibility for the average rate of inflation over the long pull. It is the central 
bank alone that has the duty of ensuring secular price stability, along with its other   54
objective of promoting maximum employment or, relatedly, sustainable economic 
growth, in the intermediate term. These objectives were enshrined in the Federal Reserve 
Act in 1977. 
  Although he never mentioned this 1977 statutory addition, former Chairman 
Burns presented the 1979 Per Jacobsson lecture in Belgrade on September 30, entitled 
“The Anguish of Central Banking,” in which he delved more deeply into the dilemma of 
monetary policymaking—attributing it to this fundamental factor: 
...the persistent inflationary bias that has emerged from the philosophic 
and political currents that have been transforming economic life in the 
United States and elsewhere since the 1930s. The essence of the unique 
inflation of our times and the reason central bankers have been ineffective 
in dealing with it can be understood only in terms of those currents of 
thought and the political environment they have created... 
  Inflation came to be widely viewed as a temporary phenomenon—
or provided it remained mild, as an acceptable condition. “Maximum” or 
“full” employment, after all, had become the nation’s economic major 
goal—not stability of the price level...Fear of immediate unemployment—
rather than fear of current or eventual inflation—came to dominate 
economic policymaking... 
  Viewed in the abstract, the Federal Reserve System had the power 
to abort the inflation at its incipient stage fifteen years ago or at any later 
point, and it has the power to end it today. At any time within that period, 
it could have restricted the money supply and created sufficient strains in 
financial and industrial markets to terminate inflation with little delay. It 
did not do so because the Federal Reserve was itself caught up in the 
philosophic and political currents that were transforming American life 
and culture... (Burns, 1979, pp. 9,13,15)         
  
  Chairman Burns gave the following basic reason for why the role of the central 
bank in fighting inflation in a democracy would be “subsidiary” and “very limited,” thus 
rendering it able to cope “only marginally” with inflation, causing him to think that “we 
would look in vain to technical reforms as a way of eliminating the inflationary bias of 
industrial countries” (Burns, 1979, pp. 21-22):   55
Every time the Government moved to enlarge the flow of benefits to the 
population at large, or to this or that group, the assumption was implicit 
that monetary policy would somehow accommodate the action. A similar 
tacit assumption was embodied in every pricing or wage bargain arranged 
by private parties or the Government. The fact that such actions could in 
combination be wholly incompatible with moderate rates of monetary 
expansion was seldom considered by those who initiated them, despite the 
frequent warnings by the Federal Reserve that new fires of inflation were 
being ignited. If the Federal Reserve then sought to create a monetary 
environment that fell seriously short of accommodating the upward 
pressures on prices that were being released or reinforced by governmental 
action, severe difficulties could be quickly produced in the economy. Not 
only that, the Federal Reserve would be frustrating the will of Congress—
a Congress that was intent on providing additional services to the 
electorate and on assuring that jobs and incomes were maintained, 
particularly in the short run. 
  Facing these political realities, the Federal Reserve was still 
willing to step hard on the monetary brake at times—as in 1966, 1969, and 
1974—but its restrictive stance was not maintained long enough to end 
inflation...As the Federal Reserve...kept testing and probing the limits of 
its freedom to undernourish the inflation, it repeatedly evoked violent 
criticism from both the Executive establishment and the Congress and 
therefore had to devote much of its energy to warding off legislation that 
would destroy any hope of ending inflation. This testing process 
necessarily involved political judgments, and the Federal Reserve may at 
times have overestimated the risks attaching to additional monetary 
restraint.  (Burns,  1979,  pp.  15-16)       
           
  In essence, Burns suggested that, if a central bank had committed the 
expansionary errors that generated inflation, as had happened in the late 1960s and 1970s 
in the United States, public and political support appeared necessary to maintain the 
much tougher policies that might be required to restore stability. Without such support, it 
could be questioned whether a central bank had the mandate for such action. Nonetheless, 
Burns ended his lecture on an optimistic note, observing that the political environment 
was indeed shifting in that direction.  
When Chairman Volcker was appointed to the Board, public support of anti-  56
inflationary action had become quite high, and political sentiment appeared much more 
conducive than ever before to strong actions resisting inflation. By the late 1970s, public 
opinion polls consistently identified inflation as a greater problem than that of 
unemployment. In any event, Chairman Volcker said in an interview on PBS’s 
Commanding Heights (2000) that he listened to, and was much affected by, this lecture 
by Chairman Burns before he returned to Washington. He thought that Chairman Burns 
was saying that as a practical matter the Federal Reserve was “rather impotent” in 
fighting inflation. While that might have been the case earlier in the decade, Chairman 
Volcker obviously disagreed that this assessment was still correct in 1979. In retrospect, 
he was right. The FOMC at the end of the day proved able to live up to its obligation of 
being responsible for establishing and maintaining stable prices over time. 
Point Twelve  
That a tightening of monetary policy could evoke “violent criticism” by 
“frustrating the will” of a Congress intent on “assuring that jobs and incomes were 
maintained,” as Chairman Burns contended, can be supported from the contemporaneous 
statements about the economic goals of the elected officials themselves. For example, on 
October 19, 1979, the Senate majority leader, Robert C. Byrd, Democrat from West 
Virginia, declared: 
Attempting to control inflation or protect the dollar by throwing legions of 
people out of work and shutting down shifts in our factories and mines is a 
hopeless policy. (Greider, 1987, p. 149)         
        
  As another example, Representative Henry S. Reuss, Democrat from Wisconsin, 
chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, said after the   57
four-to-three vote on the discount rate on September 18, 1979, 
For the first time, Fed members are wondering out loud whether it really 
makes sense to throw men and women out of work, and businesses into 
bankruptcy, in order to ‘rescue the dollar’ by chasing ever-rising European 
interest rates. (Berry, 1979, p. A1) 
  
  Although Representative Reuss was a general supporter of the new operating 
procedures, at Chairman Volcker’s first Humphrey-Hawkins testimony on February 19, 
1980, this is what he said: 
Last year, following our first hearings, under the procedures established in 
Humphrey-Hawkins, we issued a report on March 12, 1979, agreed to by 
all except one of our members.  
  The key recommendation of that report was “anti-inflationary 
policies must not cause a recession.” 
  So far, the Federal Reserve’s policies have not caused a recession 
and for that, you deserve our appreciation... 
  The Federal Reserve cannot cure inflation with monetary shock 
treatment and it shouldn’t try. (U.S. House of Representatives, 1980b, pp. 
1-2)                                                  
    
  In 1982, with the economy having slid into a recession, both Republicans 
and Democrats introduced legislation that would have required the Federal 
Reserve to keep real interest rates within the range of historical experience, which 
could have potentially interfered with the conduct of monetary policy in a 
damaging manner.  
In Point Three above, we saw that the IMF noted, “It is evident that governments 
have felt severe economic and political constraints in launching an effective anti-inflation 
program, since in the short run this would be bound to have severe employment effects 
...”  Perhaps in part to circumvent those political constraints, the FOMC members 
appreciated the fact that the new procedures distanced them from the setting of the funds   58
rate, as Point Seven demonstrated, and Chairman Volcker’s answer to the question about 
real-side impacts in the press conference on October 6, as quoted above, was sufficiently 
noncommittal that William Greider claimed that “he evaded the point and concealed his 
real expectations” (Greider, 1987, p. 123). 
But these inferences inevitably enter into the realm of speculation, because the 
motivation of participants in the onrush of history is rarely specified at the time. Even so, 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that potential criticisms of FOMC policy by 
politicians, who in coming years actually would show stirrings—by introducing 
legislation—of using their power to affect the FOMC’s makeup or freedom of action, 
engendered in Committee members the desire to obscure their responsibility for real-side 
developments. 
“WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE!” OR NOT! 
 
  Indisputably, market participants were somewhat confused, especially early on, 
by what the new procedures were and what they portended for monetary aggregates and 
the money market, let alone for longer-term interest rates, real magnitudes, and inflation. 
One diagnosis would be to highlight a failure by the Federal Reserve to communicate the 
nature of its new policy approach soon enough and with enough specificity to satisfy the 
public’s, and especially market participants’, pressing desire to know. In particular, 
between October 6, 1979, and February 1, 1980, the FOMC did not release any detailed 
summary of its new technique. In consequence, at its meeting on February 3-4, 1980
12,
 
the SOMC held that 
                                                           
12 The SOMC meeting was on Sunday, February 3, 1980, so the members of the committee were not aware 
of the attachment to Volcker’s February 1 Joint Economic Committee testimony.    59
The Federal Reserve should announce further details about its procedures 
to reduce the long-run trend of money growth and reestablish its 
credibility by actually achieving its announced targets. This would be the 
most effective way to eliminate the entrenched belief that the rate of 
inflation will continue to rise in the Eighties. (SOMC, 1980, p. 2) 
 
Was one reason for this reticence because the FOMC was operating under a 
legacy of secrecy inherited from the tenures of Chairmen Martin, Burns, and Miller? (see, 
Goodfriend, 1986). Could this tradition be used to explain, at least in part, why, for 
example, the Axilrod-Sternlight memorandum was not released immediately? Immediate 
release of this memorandum shortly after October 6 would have revealed for the world to 
see a systematic, considered monetary-policy approach. 
  An alternative diagnosis would be that existing contingences, inevitable 
complexities, the intended audience, and unavoidable uncertainties all posed severe 
challenges to clear communication, which could only be surmounted over time. As has 
already been seen in the historical record, the FOMC actually had adopted the new 
operating procedures on a temporary, contingent basis, awaiting evidence on just how 
effectively they would work given the uncertainties involved, including those regarding 
money demand (FOMC Transcript, 10/6/1979, p. 9-10, 15). However, as Peter Sternlight 
learned, presumably to his chagrin, it is difficult to make the point initially, that new 
procedures have “experimental” elements, without seeming to undercut the resolve and 
understanding of the agency implementing them.  As the rational expectations revolution 
has emphasized, a “permanent” commitment has a much more powerful effect on 
expectations than a “temporary” one. To be sure, the FOMC did not stress publicly the 
contingent nature of its adoption of the new operating technique. Still, the Committee did   60
not discuss and reaffirm its earlier tentative decision to adopt the new approach until it 
met on January 8, 1980. Only afterward was Chairman Volcker ready to release publicly 
the “technical” description of the new procedures, which he did on February 1, 1980.  
   In addition, the new procedures, without question, were complex. The 
memorandum by Axilrod and Sternlight, which describes the essence of the new 
procedure, was composed as a background paper presenting a policy choice to the 
FOMC, for which their writing style was well suited. It certainly was not written with the 
simplicity and pedantry needed for public consumption.  Financial market participants are 
trained and paid primarily to buy low and sell high. Admittedly, they have a longer 
attention span for digesting, and greater capacity to grasp, Federal Reserve analyses 
describing the intricacies of monetary policymaking than does the public at large. But 
even with a hypothetical manual containing a perfect prediction and complete elucidation 
of what the new procedures would be and how they would work, it is probable that 
market participants would have been able to assimilate the main features of those 
procedures only gradually from practical experience. 
  Furthermore, certain features simply could not have been known by the Federal 
Reserve in advance. Although the basic procedures had been considered before their 
approval on October 6, 1979, some elements could not have been settled except through 
the passage of time. Initially, these inherently uncertain, and thus imperfectly describable, 
features included (i) how aggressive the FOMC would be in setting and varying the 
monetary target paths, the initial borrowing assumption, and the band for allowable funds 
trading; (ii) how extensive intermeeting policy-related adjustments to the nonborrowed   61
reserves target path would be; (iii) how extensive intermeeting technical “multiplier” 
adjustments to the nonborrowed reserves target path would be; and (iv) how responsive 
the monetary aggregates, the real economy, and inflation would be to these various 
ministrations. 
  FOMC communication, operating within this context, naturally had the obligation 
to strive for maximum conciseness and clarity; but in judging the Federal Reserve’s 
success in public communication in this case, especially late in 1979 and early in 1980, a 
historian must carefully parse the words used by the principals. Take as an example the 
interview that appeared in the WSJ on October 11, in which a contemporary reader may 
not consider the “Fed official” to be a paragon of clear communication. (See pages 32-33 
above.)  But such a reading risks misinterpreting the meaning of the words used in what 
arguably was an informative description of a complex, responsive, and discretionary 
monetary policy approach.  
  First, a “rule of thumb” was meant to convey something that the Federal Reserve 
certainly was not going to propound: an oversimplified summary representation of a 
complex underlying system. Second, at the time the word “rule” by itself had a different 
meaning than it does today because John Taylor’s famous usage, which has been adopted 
by the profession, has altered its definition among economists to mean merely a 
“guideline” subject to judgmental overthrow.  Then, the word “rule” had been used 
influentially by Milton Friedman in the “rules versus discretion” debate to mean a 
legislated requirement that would have to be followed strictly. Besides 
“nondiscretionary,” a “rule”—also unlike today’s sense—was “nonresponsive” to current   62
business cycle developments as well, as in Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule or 
Allan Meltzer’s monetary base growth rule. Only later did Allan Meltzer and Bennett 
McCallum introduce and advocate variable base growth in a nondiscretionary rule, 
explicitly employing the concept of a “responsive, nondiscretionary rule” (Meltzer, 1987; 
McCallum, 1988). Third, the word “unpredictable” apparently did not pass the Fed 
official’s lips; instead, it was the reporter’s word, although Chairman Volcker did believe 
that some “uncertainty” about future monetary policy settings could be useful in 
curtailing “speculation” (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992, p. 170). Finally, today’s vantage 
point makes it clear—although it may have been less clear in the interview—that the 
“Fed official” was saying, not that a thought-out systematic structure of the new 
procedures did not “exist” (since it certainly did in the Axilrod-Sternlight memorandum), 
but rather that the Federal Reserve’s “future behavior” hadn’t taken place and obviously 
couldn’t yet be pictured in detail.  Only the passage of time could clarify the emerging 
contours of the operational landscape. 
WAS CHAIRMAN VOLCKER…  
  In attempting to draw lessons for the present day from the October 1979 policy 
reform, it seems necessary to classify the essential characteristics that made Chairman 
Volcker’s FOMCs successful at fighting inflation and setting the stage for Chairman 
Greenspan’s FOMCs to finish the job. This section addresses the questions of whether 
Chairman Volcker was (i) a monetarist? (ii) a nominal income targeter? (iii) a new, neo, 
or old-fashioned Keynesian? (iv) an inflation targeter? (v) a great communicator?  
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A Monetarist? 
  
   Chairman Volcker’s scientific views on the merits and demerits of the doctrine of 
monetarism arguably changed little during his years as President of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank and Chairman of the Board of Governors, judging by various 
FOMC transcripts, speeches, and testimony. As already seen, he subscribed to the long-
run connection between average money growth and inflation, although some, though not 
all, nonmonetarist macroeconomists at the time would have agreed with this secular 
linkage. He also expressed this point of view in September 1976, when he presented an 
extended analysis of monetarism to an academic audience. He first characterized the 
school not only as having correctly insisted that money matters but also as having 
...usefully emphasized the danger of confusion between nominal and real 
rates and the role of price expectations. They have forcefully made the 
case for the view that in the long run velocity is not related to the stock of 
money and that, in the same long run, an excess supply of money 
contributes not to real income or wealth but simply to inflation. (Volcker, 
1976, p. 251-52.) 
 
  However, he then prophetically noted that  
 
...no one should be under the illusion that any tactical change will end 
controversy that, in the last analysis, stems more from different judgments 
about relevant policy variables than about operating techniques. (Volcker, 
1976, p. 253) 
 
  He outlined many of the disadvantages to money targeting that in the second half 
of 1982 would ring the death knell, though admittedly at first in a muted way, to 
monetary targeting at a low growth rate: 
...the simple fact that, whatever the stability in the relationship between 
money and nominal income in the longer run, there is considerable 
instability in the relationship over time horizons relevant to policymakers. 
Certainly the relationships between money, interest rates, and nominal   64
income have been unusual over the year or so since I rejoined the Federal 
Reserve...I can only conclude that, in periods such as that we have just 
been through, we need to be alert to possible shifts in the demand for 
money. (Volcker, 1976, p. 252) 
 
He continued, 
 
...we must constantly balance the danger of underreacting to deviations of 
the aggregates from target paths against the danger of 
overreacting...Clearly, there are risks in not responding to bulges or 
shortfalls in the money supply relative to objectives... 
  But the danger of overreacting to deviations in the aggregates from 
targets is just as real...Attempts to respond immediately to shifting reserve 
availability and allowing the money market abruptly to tighten or ease 
could therefore easily result in whipsawing of the market...Since only a 
relatively small fraction of the impact of a given move in reserve 
availability or money market conditions is reflected in the behavior of the 
monetary aggregates in the short run, very large movements in reserves 
and money market conditions might be needed to correct short-run 
aberrations. Worse, the lagged effect of these moves might then have to be 
offset by even larger movements in the opposite direction in the 
subsequent period—a process that could easily lead to a serious disruption 
of the whole mechanism. (Volcker, 1976, p. 254)   
  
   He argued that if a central bank turns toward significant monetary restraint, it can 
induce difficult reactions on the real side, with broader ramifications: 
It is hardly a satisfactory answer to say that central banks in principle can 
always resist inflationary pressures by simply refusing to provide enough 
money to finance them. Set against persistent expansionary pressures, 
aggressive wage demands, monopolistic or regulatory patterns that resist 
downward price adjustments, and other factors affecting cost levels, such 
an approach would threaten chronic conflict with goals of growth and 
employment that must rank among the most important national objectives. 
In a democracy, the risk would not be just to the political life of a 
particular government, but to our way of government itself... 
  In this larger social and political setting, we should perhaps think 
of central banks themselves as “endogenous” to the system. A theory of 
chronic inflation that points only to the money supply is not going to 
prove adequate to understand—or deal with—inflation in today’s world. 
The danger is that it may discourage the search for particular remedies for 
particular problems... 
  The monetarists, emphasizing old truths in modern clothing, have   65
provided a large service in redressing the balance. It is in pressing the 
point to an extreme that the danger lies—the impression that only money 
matters and that a fixed rate of reserve expansion can answer most of the 
complicated problems of economic policy. (Volcker, 1976, p. 255-56) 
 
  As to the monetarist arguments on technical issues of operating procedures, he 
also articulated positions that foreshadowed the FOMC’s side in future debates and in the 
Staff Study in 1981: 
While I do not pretend to econometric expertise, I do know that a massive 
amount of research has been conducted in this area. The apparent result is 
that the relationship between money and reserve aggregates, particularly in 
the short run, appears no more reliable than the relationship between 
interest rates and money... 
  We have techniques to make the needed forecasts with both the 
interest rate and reserve approaches. The trouble is that the forecast errors 
are large no matter what procedure is used, particularly over periods of 
one to three months. Indeed, unimpressive as they are, I am told some of 
the correlations observed in the historical data between reserve measures 
and monetary measures would prove to be spurious under a regime of 
rigid reserve targeting. (Volcker, 1976, p. 253-54) 
 
When the entire 13-paper Staff Study (BOG, 1981) was published, the Federal Reserve 
gave the results a lot of play, ranging from an extended discussion in the February 1981 
Humphrey-Hawkins report, to a press conference, to two conferences for economists (the 
conference for academic economists was April 17, 1981, with lead-off statements from 
Karl Brunner and Stephen Goldfeld, and the conference for market economists was April 
21, 1981), to a Federal Reserve Bulletin article by Stephen Axilrod (1981).   
  Monetarists did not believe that the FOMC had gone nearly far enough in the 
reforms of October 1979 and seized on the Staff Study to reiterate their points. Milton 
Friedman critically reviewed the experience (Friedman, 1982). Peter Sternlight and 
Stephen Axilrod vied in person with Robert Rasche and Allen Meltzer in a heralded   66
debate on April 30, 1981, at The Ohio State University (Rasche et al., 1982). Even so, 
two of the Staff Study’s papers were published by Karl Brunner, editor of the Journal of 
Monetary Economics.
13 In addition, at a conference held at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis in October 1981, David E. Lindsey was asked to examine the institutional 
changes needed to improve control of the money stock.
14 
  Even during the period of monetary targeting, Chairman Volcker made his 
skeptical opinion of monetarism plain, first to Congress and then later to his FOMC 
colleagues: 
Chairman Volcker...I would remind you that nothing that has happened—
or that I’ve observed recently—makes the money/GNP relationship any 
clearer or more stable than before. Having gone through all these 
redefinition problems, one recognizes how arbitrary some of this is. It 
depends on how you define [money].  (FOMC Transcript, 1/8-9/1980, pp. 
13-14) 
  
  Finally, the FOMC’s departure from low-growth monetary targeting after mid-
year in 1982, and the subsequent downgrading of M1 itself as well as replacement of 
nonborrowed reserves with borrowed reserves in the fall of that year, which are beyond 
the scope of this paper, also suggest as well that Paul A. Volcker did not qualify as a 
monetarist.  
 A Nominal Income Targeter? 
  Nominal income targeting was in the air in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the 
writings of James Tobin, Bennett McCallum, Robert Gordon and others. In a sense, 
money and nominal income targeting could be viewed as closely related. Indeed, to 
                                                           
13 Tinsley, von zur Muehlen, and Fries, 1982; Lindsey et al., 1984. 
14 See, Lindsey, 1983. 
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emphasize this point, James Tobin even referred to GNP targets as “velocity adjusted 
aggregates” (Tobin, 1985). Thus, the following quotation from Chairman Volcker’s 1981 
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony perhaps could be read as the statement of a closet 
nominal-income targeter: 
I would like to turn to the targets for 1981. Those targets were set with the 
intention of achieving further reduction in the growth of money and credit, 
returning such growth over time to amounts consistent with the capacity of 
the economy to grow at stable prices. Against the background of the 
strong inflationary momentum in the economy, the targets are frankly 
designed to be restrictive. They do imply restraint on the potential growth 
of the nominal GNP. If inflation continues unabated or rises, real activity 
is likely to be squeezed. As inflation begins noticeably to abate, the stage 
will be set for stronger real growth. (Volcker, 1981, pp. 5-6)   
   
  However, this interpretation would be inaccurate. To be sure, monetary targeting 
would constrain the growth of nominal GNP, which is what Chairman Volcker was 
pointing out. But literal nominal GNP targeting would not have met with his approval, at 
least in the environment facing the Committee in 1979, for two reasons at a minimum. 
  First, a more directly controllable intermediate target than GNP was necessary to 
restore the public’s confidence in the Federal Reserve’s commitment to conquering 
inflation. While policy could be adjusted to maintain M1 growth within an announced 
range over relatively short periods, thus demonstrating that the Federal Reserve meant 
business, that could not be said of a nominal GNP target. The lags in the transmission 
process were, as they remain, too long, uncertain, and variable for that purpose, and too 
many other factors outside a central bank’s control influence nominal income over short 
intervals.  Second, nominal income targeting would not have represented as stark a break 
from the gradualist policies of the past as the Committee must have felt was necessary.   68
As described by Tobin, and in light of the policy lags involved, nominal income targeting 
would require the central bank to continue to fine-tune the stance of policy on the basis of 
predictions of the future, hardly a recipe for success given the profession’s sad 
forecasting record earlier in the 1970s. Stephen Axilrod later offered the following 
summary regarding the superiority of monetary targets: 
A money supply guide has two virtues: the central bank can be held 
reasonably responsible and accountable for its achievement, and it will 
serve as an anchor to the windward against erroneous assessments of 
ongoing and predicted economic and price developments. (Axilrod, 1985, 
p. 600) 
In 1979, Chairman Volcker himself clearly put predominant priority on 
conquering inflation. Nominal GNP targeting did not appear as certain a strategy for 
gaining the public’s confidence and for fairly promptly achieving that goal as monetary 
targeting did. 
A New, Neo, or Old-Fashioned Keynesian? 
  A basic policy recommendation arising from the Keynesian framework, old, new-
, and neo-, is that policy can be successful in stabilizing the economy by aiming to align 
aggregate demand with the nation’s potential supply. In one sense, the theoretical 
argument behind this reasoning is impeccable, under the assumption that the implied 
policy prescription can be applied in practice. But Volcker rejected the premise that 
policy should actively seek to close output or unemployment and related gaps, judging 
that the informational requirements of such calculations were simply untenable.  
The original Taylor rule, which used outcomes for the estimated output gap, that 
is, actual output less potential output, provides a useful illustration of the gap-closing   69
Keynesian perspective. But unlike this Taylor rule, the reaction function consistent with 
targeting money growth instead, from a money demand perspective, would use outcomes 
for estimated output growth. That is, whereas the Taylor rule stresses the role of the 
output gap for setting policy, a reaction function for controlling money growth would 
instead stress the growth rate of output relative to that of potential—that is, the change in 
the output gap. And indeed, estimated policy reaction functions suggest that while 
Federal Reserve policy appeared to respond to such gaps quite strongly before Volcker 
became Chairman, this was no longer the case afterwards (Orphanides, 2003b, 2004).  
Because he had little tolerance for gap analysis, it is clear that he should not be 
placed in any of these camps. It is less certain that these camps were any more tolerant of 
inflation than he was, but he obviously had a very low tolerance for inflation.    
An Inflation Targeter?  
  Does that mean that he anticipated today’s advocates of inflation targeting, such 
as Governor Ben Bernanke, Thomas Laubach, Rick Mishkin, Adam Posen, and the 
current International Monetary Fund or the central bank practitioners in New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada, England, Sweden, Korea, Poland, and South Africa?
15 Not really, to 
the extent that they attempt to heighten central bank transparency through an announced, 
explicit numerical target or range for the inflation rate. Instead, in a speech before an 
audience of academics in 1983—jocularly called “Can We Survive Prosperity?”
16— 
Chairman Volcker proposed a qualitative definition of price stability: 
A workable definition of reasonable “price stability” would seem to me to 
                                                           
15 See, Bernanke et al., 1999. 
16 Early in the preparation process for this speech, he even more jocularly suggested the following title: 
“What Economists Don’t Know—That Can Hurt You!” (David Lindsey’s recollection.)   70
be a situation in which expectations of generally rising (or falling) prices 
over a considerable period are not a pervasive influence on economic and 
financial behavior. Stated more positively, “stability” would imply that 
decision-making should be able to proceed on the basis that “real” and 
“nominal” values are substantially the same over the planning horizon—
and that planning horizons should be suitably long. (Volcker, 1983, p. 5) 
 
His disdain of forecasts as a policymaking tool also would have turned him 
against some recent practices for attempting to attain an inflation target. All things 
considered, he certainly didn’t sound like a prototypical inflation targeter.    
A Great Communicator? 
  In his days as President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, he referenced 
approvingly the degree of openness in the policy record: 
...I might note in passing that the amount of information provided in these 
records probably sets a standard among the major central banks in the 
world, and represents a degree of openness entirely unknown to a central 
banker of an earlier generation. (Volcker, 1976, p. 253) 
 
  Chairman Volcker advanced the case for effective communication early in his 
tenure at the Board, as well as the advantages of monetary targeting in this regard: 
All of this puts a special burden on those of us developing and 
implementing policy to “get it right,” to communicate our purposes and 
intentions effectively, and to persevere with needed policies.  
  In that context, I am satisfied that the greater emphasis we have 
placed on monetary targeting in recent years, supplemented by the change 
in operating techniques, has assisted both in communicating what we are 
about and achieving the internal discipline necessary to act in a timely 
way. (Volcker, 1980f, p. 6) 
  
  For the not-quite-three years of serious (if not always effective) short-term 
monetary targeting, FOMC communication indisputably was more transparent than in the 
surrounding years, when the FOMC did not intend for its communication to be very 
open—and succeeded admirably—in realizing its intention. Despite the transparency   71
under monetary targeting, the Committee was accused of adopting the new operating 
procedures only as a smokescreen to obscure its intention to markedly increase short-term 
interest rates. We have found no evidence to substantiate this claim and therefore 
consider it invalid. Instead, what does make for a fascinating debate, as there are two 
legitimate sides, is whether the Committee’s communication during the period of 
monetary targeting moved toward openness as completely as it should have. In what 
follows, we try in a single discussion to give the flavor of each side of the debate.  
  The fanfare surrounding the announcement of the new procedures, the testimonies 
of Chairman Volcker and other Board members, the speeches by Board members and 
Reserve Bank presidents, the Humphrey-Hawkins reports, the official staff studies, the 
Bulletin article, and the unofficial staff papers must have served a communications end. 
The general principles underlying the new approach were well explained, and the FOMC, 
if only by dint of repetition, must have gotten these messages across over time, at least to 
some extent.  
  To be sure, the Committee convinced most observers that it meant business in 
large measure only by successfully reducing actual inflation as time went on. Survey 
responses regarding inflationary expectations and long-term interest rates did not respond 
immediately to the Federal Reserve’s new operating procedures and associated stirring 
words; instead, it took some years, along with the reduction in actual inflation, for them 
to come down on a sustained basis. Market participants understandably would have been 
somewhat skeptical initially that real reforms would continue when the going got rough, 
so they needed to see the lower inflation results before they would fully believe that a   72
“regime change” had occurred. Whether publicly quantifying its inflation goal would 
have allowed the FOMC to shorten this period of adjustment can be debated. In any 
event, observers on the outside from the beginning could see the new operating 
procedures working themselves out in money markets as advertised in those Federal 
Reserve descriptions. While the Federal Reserve did not publish its short-run target paths 
for M1 and reserves, let alone the Federal Reserve’s daily balance sheet or the reserve 
factor forecasts made by staff at the Trading Desk and the Board, most people on the 
outside did not care to know about the detailed plumbing of the new monetary control 
procedures.
17 Instead, they just wanted to be sure that those on the inside were in fact 
minding the store and would “get it right,” in Chairman Volcker’s phrase.   
  The communications problems that did emerge concerned the public’s basic 
understanding of exactly what constituted “getting it right,” because effective monetary 
targeting proved to be no easy matter. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the 
increasing challenges of monetary targeting and the eventual departure from it via a 
nonborrowed reserves-based operating procedure, whatever the departure’s merits or 
demerits, in Chairman Volcker’s mind clearly could not be discussed openly—despite its 
only temporary adoption in the first place—perhaps partly in light of the favorable public 
comments the FOMC had made about the approach. 
  This brings us to the basic question of whether Chairman Volcker could be 
classified as a great, or even mediocre, communicator? One aspect of this question in turn 
                                                           
17 At the January 1980 FOMC meeting, President Roos asked about heightening market knowledge and 
“dynamism” by releasing the reserve paths publicly. Peter Sternlight replied that intermeeting adjustments 
to those paths would only sow confusion if the quantitative process was carried out in public. He said, 
though, that more explanation of the “general methodology” would be warranted (FOMC Transcript, 1/8-9,   73
can be decomposed thusly: Was communication about the future stance of policy 
transparent, and why or why not? Was communication about the present stance of policy 
transparent, and why or why not? 
  The first component question is the easier to answer. As a simple matter of pure 
logic, knowing and revealing publicly anything about the future stance of policy requires 
knowledge not only about the FOMC’s ultimate objectives and future reaction function 
but also about the outlook for economic activity and inflation. As the historical narrative 
repeatedly demonstrated, Chairman Volcker was not just skeptical about but almost 
dismissive of economists’ attempts to forecast the future. Indeed, he expressed the view 
that basing policy on such efforts had proven to be a counterproductive strategy in the 
1970s. Given that attitude, he certainly would not have wanted the central bank to suffer 
the indignity of having its public statements about its own future policy stance, which 
necessarily would have had to rest on those same error-prone forecasts, frequently proven 
wrong by the march of events. This was obviously the case during the episode of 
monetary targeting. Even after the fall of 1982, when the Committee was instructing the 
Desk to pursue a borrowing operating target, the FOMC did not try to hint at what the 
future level of borrowing might be. 
  The answer to the second component question, about publicly describing the 
current policy stance, is much more difficult to prove—though not to provide—because it 
is necessarily more speculative. People tend not to express “politically incorrect” 
sentiments—to use the term former Governor Laurence Meyer has recently employed in 
a different macroeconomic context—on the record for historians later to uncover (Meyer, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1980, pp. 9-10).   74
2004, pp. 75-76). Thus, much of what follows cannot be conclusively demonstrated, but 
is based on the “atmospherics” around the Board in the 1980s (David Lindsey’s 
recollection). A major role was played by political threats to FOMC independence, which 
also is largely beyond the scope of this paper, as is politicians’ switch to deploying an 
altogether different strategy in the first half of the 1990s, which involved certain issues of 
transparency, and naturally induced an alternative defensive posture by the Federal 
Reserve. The post-1982 threats to Federal Reserve independence came from members of 
both parties in the Congress and fed back on the transparency of the Federal Reserve 
under Chairman Volcker. Particularly in the post-monetary-targeting portion of his tenure 
as Board Chairman, the FOMC was guarded in its communicative detail. Indeed, the 
FOMC of this period revealed its propensity for “constructive ambiguity,” a term that 
always could be used in polite company. A less-inhibited modern observer instead might 
call the Committee “opaque” or, even worse, “non-transparent.” 
  Actually, what is not so transparent to the modern observer was precisely the 
Committee’s defensive motivation at the time. An important concern was to avoid 
criticism, which could well have resulted in political pressure, which in turn could well 
have adversely affected the conduct of monetary policy. It is worth remembering that 
congressional criticism of what would now be termed sound, anti-inflationary monetary 
policy was not uncommon at the time. Sharp criticism of interest rate hikes by politicians, 
who ultimately might be successful in passing legislation altering the Federal Reserve’s 
makeup or limiting its maneuvering room, would only render an already difficult decision 
to tighten even more so.    75
  Without transparency, a decision that likely or certainly would have raised the 
funds rate, but not the discount rate, would not have been known even to the market 
cognoscenti at a minimum until the next day through the signals imparted by the 
operations of the Trading Desk. And the action might or might not have been covered in 
financial news stories on the business pages of the newspapers until the day after that. By 
then the news would have been sufficiently outdated that few politicians would have 
bothered to comment in real time. 
  By contrast, with the transparency of, for example, an immediate announcement 
of a change in the stance of policy, reports by the media would have been immediate. 
Commentators, including politicians, would have given their reactions on camera the 
same afternoon. The story would have been covered in the television news programs that 
evening and then would have appeared on the front pages of the major newspapers the 
next day. In other words, transparency would have transformed the action from a little-
noticed technical adjustment in the obscure market for bank reserves into a big deal. In 
the resulting goldfish bowl, tightening would have been harder to decide to do—yielding 
worse monetary policy and, hence, inferior national economic results.  
  In light of these considerations, Volcker’s advice to a “new central banker,” as 
recounted by Mervyn King, is entirely understandable: 
When I joined the Bank of England in 1991, I was fortunate enough to be 
invited to dine with a group that included Paul Volcker. At the end of the 
evening I asked Paul if he had a word of advice for a new central banker. 
He replied—in one word—"mystique." That single word encapsulated 
much of the tradition and wisdom of central banking at that time. (King, 
2000) 
  
This advice is, of course, not that of a great communicator.    76
Summary  
 
  The fundamentally negative answer to the last several questions implies that 
Chairman Volcker can not readily be pigeonholed. To be sure, he unswervingly held to 
the end of conquering inflation. However, he was pragmatic in his choice of means. Paul 
A. Volcker, whose FOMCs went much of the way in conquering inflation, was a true 
original.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Inflation was well entrenched in the United States by the time President Carter 
appointed Paul Volcker Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979. For more than a 
decade, the Federal Reserve had attempted to cure the problem with a seemingly 
appropriate gradualist approach. By nudging short-term interest rates in small steps, 
monetary policy could be sufficiently expansionary to support reasonably high 
employment and growth, thereby avoiding recession, while at the same time be restrictive 
enough to maintain some slack in aggregate demand, thereby making progress on 
inflation. In theory, by focusing on short-run demand management, both economic 
stability and gradual progress on inflation could be attained. Instead this approach 
delivered instability and an ever-worsening inflationary psychology.  
In 1978 Paul Volcker had already recognized that an approach placing greater 
emphasis on controlling inflation, instead of the strategy in place, would be more fruitful: 
Wider recognition of the limits on the ability of demand management to 
keep the economy at a steady full employment path, especially when 
expectations are hypersensitive to the threat of more inflation, provides a 
more realistic point for policy formulation. So do the increasing, and in 
my mind well-justified, concerns with the problem of inflation by the 
national administration and by the citizenry. (Volcker, 1978, pp. 61-61)   77
 
Throughout the first half of 1979, Volcker was part of a vocal minority on the 
FOMC noting that the inflationary situation was approaching crisis proportions. But 
agonizing fears of recession kept the majority in Chairman Miller’s FOMC from 
tightening policy to the extent necessary to contain inflation. President Carter’s 
nomination of Paul Volcker to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve in late July started to 
shift this balance. But by late September 1979, the FOMC came to face the underlying 
crisis that Paul Volcker had worried aloud about since the first FOMC meeting of the 
year: mounting inflationary momentum and accompanying heightened inflation 
expectations. In addition, a policy crisis had recently emerged as well, whose proximate 
trigger was the reaction in the media and commodity markets to the four-to-three split of 
the Board of Governors in its discount rate vote on September 18. Prior to that vote but 
after his nomination as Chairman on July 25, Volcker had been portrayed in the media as 
an invincible general leading the war against inflation. By contrast, in its reporting on the 
discount-rate vote, the media pictured Volcker as a general whose troops, if not deserting, 
were in major retreat. Jumps in commodity prices also revealed that the FOMC had lost 
credibility regarding its commitment to an anti-inflationary policy. 
A “strategic plan” was required that would restore the public's faith in the FOMC 
and contain “inflationary psychology.” It had become clear to the FOMC that the “plan” 
had to be made public, break dramatically with established practice, allow for the 
possibility of substantial increases in short-term interest rates, yet be politically 
acceptable, and convince financial market participants and people more generally that it   78
would succeed. The new operating procedures, focusing on using nonborrowed reserves 
to keep monetary growth within the announced ranges for the year, satisfied these 
conditions. The available record does not suggest that the FOMC was converted to 
monetarist ideology. The “monetarist experiment” of October 1979 was not really 
monetarist! Rather, the new techniques were conditionally adopted for pragmatic 
reasons—there was a good chance that they would succeed in restoring stability. In 
essence, the Committee accepted that, under the prevailing circumstances, controlling 
monetary growth presented a robust approach to taming inflation. The “plan,” while 
undoubtedly not perfect, turned out to be pretty good. It accomplished its major 
objectives of reversing rising inflationary expectations and taking the crucial initial steps 
in a two-decade-long journey back to price stability. And, perhaps as important, it 
instilled a focus on controlling inflation and inflationary expectations as an enduring 
aspect of Federal Reserve monetary strategy.   79
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